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Abstract
Secure mobile ad hoc network (MANET) routing protocols are not tested thoroughly
against their security properties. Previous research focuses on verifying secure, reactive,
accumulation-based routing protocols. An improved methodology and framework for
secure MANET routing protocol verification is proposed which includes table-based and
proactive protocols.
The model checker, SPIN, is selected as the core of the secure MANET verification
framework. Security is defined by both accuracy and availability: a protocol forms
accurate routes and these routes are always accurate. The framework enables exhaustive
verification of protocols and results in a counter-example if the protocol is deemed
insecure.
The framework is applied to models of the Optimized Link-State Routing (OLSR)
and Secure OLSR protocol against five attack vectors. These vectors are based on known
attacks against each protocol. Vulnerabilities consistent with published findings are
automatically revealed. No unknown attacks were found; however, future attack vectors
may lead to new attacks.
The new framework for verifying secure MANET protocols extends verification
capabilities to table-based and proactive protocols. More work is needed to create attack
vectors that reveal unknown attacks against secure protocols, but the framework makes
construction of such vectors easy.
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SECURITY VERIFICATION OF SECURE
MANET ROUTING PROTOCOLS
1 Introduction
It may never be possible to prove that specific properties of routing protocols are true,
but formal verification methods can demonstrate when properties are false. Routing
protocols can be designed and suited for almost any environment from planning logistics
routes to routing packetized information over several wireless radio links. Mobile ad hoc
networks (MANETs) are a specific example of wireless routing protocols. Recently, many
secure protocols have been proposed with the intended property of route security. A
formal verification framework for security properties of MANET routing protocols can
provide a method to form concise protocol, property, and environmental definitions; to
study a protocol within a distributed system domain; to execute the protocol in an
execution environment that is conceptually near a physical implementation; and to
improve discourse over protocol properties.
1.1 MANETs and Security
The point-to-multipoint architecture, commonly referred to as access point or base
station mode, for wireless technology is well established; however, such architecture is
infeasible in military, disaster response, and remote sensor applications. This infeasibility
is apparent because point-to-multipoint architectures are dependent on infrastructure that
is not available in these applications. Forward deployed military units must provide their
own methods for communication. In disaster response scenarios communication systems
are often destroyed or overloaded, requiring rescue teams to provide their own
1
communication infrastructure. In remote sensor applications wireless sensors are deployed
in inhospitable environments with limited battery power and random sensor placement.
An alternative to the point-to-multipoint architecture is ad hoc architecture, referred
to as a MANET. MANET protocols are designed to network many wireless nodes
independently of any centralized hardware. Every node is responsible for successfully
routing information between other nodes. Effectively, all nodes are routers. These
protocols adapt to changes in radio link status, making them ideal for wireless
communication, especially in scenarios where nodes are constantly moving and no
centralized hardware can coordinate communication. The flexibility of MANET protocols
also makes them vulnerable to attacks.
Routes consist of a series of links, also known as hops, between neighboring nodes.
The goal of a MANET is to provide accurate routes between all nodes. An adversary can
affect route availability by overt jamming, preventing route formation, or injecting
inaccurate routes. A route is inaccurate when it contains one or more non-existent links.
An adversary might deploy malicious nodes with the intent of adding inaccurate routes or
blocking accurate ones.
1.2 Formal Verification
Formal verification is the task of proving that an that algorithm operates correctly
with respect to a formal property. This task takes an algorithm and one or more properties
as inputs and returns the answer of either correct or incorrect. Finding this answer is not
trivial. Several techniques and tools have been developed to assist in achieving formal
verification.
An example of formal verification can be demonstrated with loop-freedom, a property
that is common in routing protocols. A loop occurs when two nodes indefinitely forward a
packet between each other. As a result, the packet never actually reaches its intended
destination. Loops can occur when a node, A, believes it can reach the destination through
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another node, B, and B believes it can reach the same destination through A, Figure 1.1
depicts this situation. Formal verification can be performed on a routing protocol against
the property of loop-freedom. If the protocol is always free of loops, then an ideal formal
verification will output correct and an associated proof of correctness; otherwise the
output is incorrect with a counter-example describing a scenario causing the loop. In most
cases it is easier to prove that an algorithm is incorrect by providing a counter-example.
Routing Loop: A-B
AS B D
Figure 1.1: A routing loop: S sends data destined to D; A forwards data to B; B forwards
data to A; cycle repeats indefinitely and data never reaches D.
1.3 Research Problem
A framework is needed for the formal verification of secure MANET routing
protocols with respect to their stated security goals. The framework will provide concise
protocol, property, and environmental definitions. These definitions will lead to an
improved, fact-based discourse of secure routing protocols. An execution environment for
the framework will allow the protocols to be examined in the context of a distributed
system domain, without the need for physical implementation.
Accuracy and availability are the two goals associated with secure routing. When
these goals are achieved, the protocol is said to have the properties of accuracy and
availability. A routing protocol is secure if it creates routes that are accurate and those
routes are always accurate. When faced with node failures and active attacks, a secure
protocol must continue to meet its goals.
3
1.4 The Formal Verification Framework
Secure MANET routing protocols are complex. This complexity compounds with
mobility and security causing all of a verification’s possible states, known as state-space,
to increase exponentially. State-space explosion has made proofs for secure MANET
protocols difficult. However, formal methods have shown some promise in revealing
counter-examples for protocols and their security goals. Specifically, the Simple Promela
Interpreter (SPIN) has been applied to several secure, reactive routing protocols and has
automatically discovered scenarios in which security goals fail.
Andel [2] developed a framework around SPIN for exhaustively verifying a subset of
secure, accumulation-based, reactive MANET routing protocols against the property of
security. The framework is described fully in Chapter 2. Andel’s framework is unable to
analyze table-based and proactive protocols. This research adapts formal verification and
Andel’s approach to perform the property verification of table-based and proactive routing
protocols. The improved framework is demonstrated for two proactive, table-based
routing protocols, but is extensible to all table-based routing protocols.
1.5 Outline
Chapter 2 is a survey of previous works in secure MANET routing verification and
presents important background information about SPIN and secure routing protocols.
Chapter 3 is the approach taken for the verification and validation of secure, table-based
MANET routing protocols. Five example attack vectors are introduced. Chapter 4
provides the validation and verification results for the Optimized Link-State
Routing (OLSR) and Secure OLSR protocols against the attack vectors. The conclusions
and future work are discussed in Chapter 5.
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2 Background and Literature Review
This chapter provides background on the field of wireless routing protocols. It
presents the special challenges associated with wireless routing and discusses the
verification efforts applied to routing protocols. Representative reactive and proactive
protocols are introduced in both insecure and secure implementations. An emphasis is
placed on Optimized Link-State Routing (OLSR) and Secure OLSR. The Simple Promela
Interpreter (SPIN) verification tool is also introduced, and specific features are related to
their applications in mobile ad hoc network (MANET) protocol verification.
2.1 Mobile Ad Hoc Networking
Routing for physically connected devices has two commonly accepted solutions, the
link-state and distance-vector routing strategies. For both, a relatively static network, in
which the end-systems and routers change infrequently, is assumed. MANETs challenge
this assumption because mobile devices are not immobile.
The first wireless network, ALOHANET [3], was developed at Hawaii University.
This network laid the foundation for digital wireless technologies. ALOHANET was
implemented as a point-to-point architecture with a star topology. One wireless router was
used to forward data between two hosts. The problem of mobility was not addressed in
ALOHANET because all devices participating in the network were static.
In 1977, Ludwig and Roy [4] proposed saturation routing to solve the mobility
problem. The saturation routing strategy is commonly known as flooding. In saturation
routing a connection request is sent by an initiator to its nearest switch. This switch then
forwards the request on to all other switches in the network. If the destination exists on a
particular switch, that switch identifies itself to the initiator. The switches are responsible
for discovering the destination and establishing a virtual circuit connection to it. This
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solution required routing to be accomplished by specialized hardware with the sole
purpose of routing information.
In 1981, Gafni [5] proposed a method for routing data between packet radios. The
approach required each device to perform switching functions in addition to its primary
radio function. This paradigm diverges from the established infrastructure based approach
of ALOHANET and other communication networks of their time. Gafni’s approach is
considered the first ad hoc routing protocol [6].
The primary function of wireless devices in an ad hoc network varies depending on
its goal. In addition, all these devices must fulfill the critical secondary function of routing
data within their network. Routing protocols are concerned with the secondary function.
Today’s ad hoc routing schemes have not changed much from their origins. Flooding,
distance-vector, or link-state routing strategies can be found at the core of every ad hoc
routing protocol. The ad hoc implementations of these strategies differ from their origins
in that they have been optimized to preserve wireless bandwidth, decrease route delay, or
decrease power consumption in a wireless environment.
Several well accepted protocols exist for performing the routing function in ad hoc
networks. These are Dynamic MANET On-demand Routing (DYMO), Optimized
Link-State Routing (OLSR), and Simplified Multicast Forwarding (SMF). Each protocol
has been selected by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) MANET Working
Group (WG) 1 for standardization.
2.1.1 The Environment. Ad hoc networks operate in a significantly different
environment than traditional networks. Traditional networks depend on access to
infrastructural assets. Such assets may be the routers and cabling in an office building or a
wireless access point that provides wireless devices connectivity to the Internet. In both
examples fixed infrastructure is used to accomplish the goal of connecting end users. An
1 http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/manet/charter/
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ad hoc network does not have the same reliance on infrastructure. Ad hoc networks are
unique because they require every node to act as a router and they operate in a wireless
environment with the potential for high-mobility.
The ad hoc environment provides unique challenges that routing protocols must
meet. Wireless networks must account for the broadcast nature of the environment, which
impacts network density and security. Ad hoc routing protocols must also tolerate high
levels of mobility caused by movement, malfunction, failure, or compromise of any set of
nodes within the network.
The biggest problem faced in wireless networking is that of broadcast transmission,
because all communication can be overheard by unintended recipients. In a wireless
network all routing information is broadcast from each participating node. Given this
structure, no single node is poised to function as a bastion from which to protect the whole
network. The exact footprint depends on the antenna and power of the transmission. It is
generally assumed that the transmission power is equivalent for all nodes and that the
antennas are omni-directional with comparable gains. Directional antennas have been
proposed; however, their implementation is difficult in ad hoc networks because of
mobility.
Although the ALOHANET’s star topology was simple, it encountered two primary
problems: wireless digital transmissions had a high error rate, and simultaneous
transmissions on the same channel were lost. This same problem still affects all wireless
networks today. Collisions lead to a limitation in the number of users on the wireless
medium. Gupta and Kumar [7] demonstrate that the capacity, in bits per second, is upper
and lower bounded by Θ
(
1/
√
nlog(n)
)
, where n represents the number of nodes
participating in a wireless network. The capacity of a wireless network approaches zero as
the number of users approach infinity. This limitation is a direct result of broadcast
transmissions colliding. Carrier detection would prevent packet collisions; however, the
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wireless environment makes this infeasible and collision avoidance is used instead.
Collision avoidance is implemented at the data link layer and is generally not the concern
of the routing protocol.
Signal jamming is another problem exposed by wireless networks. Unintentional
jamming can be the result of adjacent wireless systems or too many participating nodes.
Intentional jamming is easily performed by an adversary broadcasting continuously at a
high power level. Jamming, in either form, disrupts communication to some or all nodes
in a network and can be considered denial of service.
Node mobility manifests in network topologies that are constantly changing. For
infrastructure based networks an ongoing session must not be interrupted even if the user
moves out of range of one access point into the range of another in the same network.
Handling topological change is only the responsibility of the access points. For ad hoc
networks mobility means an ongoing session is not interrupted. If an existing path fails a
new path needs to be established to maintain the session. This maintenance may involve
reconfiguring multiple hops until a new route is established, and must appear seamless to
the users. Mobility is a significant challenge which all MANET routing protocols must
address in their implementations.
Discovering routes in a MANET is another challenge. Mobility causes formed routes
to break; therefore, addressing mobility is related to route discovery. Depending on the
intent of the protocol, some compromises may need to be made in route latency, message
overhead, or other properties. These choices can be manipulated to achieve certain design
goals, such as quality of service, energy efficiency, and route freshness.
Wireless networks are exposed to many security vulnerabilities. Adversaries have the
potential to listen, modify, relay, and inject communication. In an unprotected network, an
adversary can subvert the routing process by injecting traffic that does not follow a
protocol’s specification. While, a protected network is more difficult to attack, a
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combination of modified and relayed traffic may make it is possible for an outsider to
subvert the routing process. In either case, it is important to realize that an adversary may
take advantage of certain technologies, such as directional antennas, to improve their
ability to listen to and inject traffic. Secure protocols may have subtle, unknown flaws.
The benefits of untethered digital devices far outweigh all the problems associated
with the wireless medium and routing. As wireless communication is accepted more and
more, it becomes imperative that all of the associated vulnerabilities are understood for
operational purposes. Mitigation is possible, but the first step is understanding the risks.
2.1.2 Applications. Ad hoc networks take on different names and meanings based
on the specific application. In this research, a MANET is a self configuring, packet
switched network, composed of wireless nodes where each node functions as both an
end-device and router. Nodes in a MANET are commonly sensors, network bridges,
communication devices, databases, or combinations of each.
The term wireless mesh network (WMN) is used to describe a network composed of
both MANET nodes and fixed infrastructure, e.g., access points, cell towers, etc. Wireless
sensor networks (WSNs) are usually deployed in inhospitable environments and in
imprecise configurations with limited power per device. Therefore, it is essential that a
sensor network be self-configuring and self-healing. WSNs are the subset of MANET
routing protocols devoted to energy aware routing. Sensor networks tend to make
assumptions about node density, battery life, and processing power. Vehicular ad hoc
networks (VANETs) are specializations of the more general MANET. These networks
place assumptions on aspects of node mobility, e.g., speed, and direction of travel. The
only assumption placed on the MANET is that all nodes are able to exhibit mobility and
must perform the required routing function. MANETs are the focal point of this research
because they encompass the goals of WMNs, WSNs, and VANETs.
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Some recent literature has focused on specialized versions of MANETs. For example,
Stajano [8] and Karlof [9] both discuss security of ad hoc networks, but only address the
class of WSN routing protocols. While this focus is important to the specific sensor
application of ad hoc networking, it loses sight of the larger class of ad hoc protocols.
2.1.3 Protocols. The underlying technology of MANETs is the routing protocol.
Protocols ensure that devices in the network can communicate with one another. There are
many ways to classify MANET routing protocols, the three most important of which are
single-phased or two-phased, accumulation-based or table-based, and proactive, reactive,
or hybrid. These classifications characterize the basic operation of any MANET routing
protocol. Each attribute carries with it distinctive benefits and drawbacks. For example, a
proactive routing protocol exhibits low route latency, but requires more control traffic for
establishing routes that may never be used.
The concept of single-phased and two-phased protocols is used by Andel [10].
Single-phased protocols are characterized by data forwarding without the use of
pre-established routes. The flooding strategy is classified as a single-phased protocol, as
well as any protocols that merely provide optimizations on top of flooding. Two-phased
protocols are divided into route discovery and data forwarding phases. Route discovery
determines what paths are available in a network. The data forwarding phase sends data
through these paths, and thus is dependent on the route discovery phase. If routes become
inaccurate then a two-phased protocol should re-initiate route discovery.
The accumulation-based or table-based classification refers to the way a protocol
stores routes between nodes. In either case the classification implies a two-phased
protocol because routes are discovered before being accumulated or stored in tables.
Accumulation-based protocols embed routes in a control segment of packetized data. At
each hop the embedded control data is used to accumulate the previous hop. Table-based
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protocols maintain routing tables in every node. The routing tables at each node are used
to make the next hop decision for packets based on the embedded destination.
The proactive, reactive, or hybrid classification relates how a routing protocol
performs route discovery. Route discovery implies all protocols under this classification
are two-phased. Proactive routing protocols continually build all possible
source-to-destination routes within a network. Every node independently stores a route for
every destination. Route storage also implies proactive protocols are table-based. Reactive
protocols build source-to-destination routes on-demand, caching active routes. Some
reactive routing protocols utilize route accumulation, storing routes only at the
destination, others are table-based and maintain a forwarding table in every node. In
reactive, table-based protocols, route entries are only added to a node’s table if the node is
in a path between the source and destination. Hybrid protocols combine proactive and
reactive behaviors. The regions of proactive and reactive operation are usually separated
by a metric such as hop-count [11].
By far, the most useful classification is that of proactive or reactive. This
classification is followed in importance by the accumulation-based or table-based
classification. Finally single-phased or two-phased classification helps to differentiate the
previous two classifications from flooding strategies. The two-phased classification
provides a dichotomy between route discovery and data forwarding. The remainder of the
routing discussion is limited to the route discovery phase. Routing security is only
concerned with route discovery. If route discovery provides inaccurate results then the
data forwarding phase is negatively impacted.
Designing a routing protocol is an art of balancing requirements and desirable
features. An illustrative example is the balance between route latency, update period, and
message overhead. Route latency refers to the time between when a route is requested for
transmission and when it becomes available. Update period refers to how often routes are
11
refreshed and reflects on how well the protocol can handle mobility. Reactive protocols
feature high latency because routes are discovered only when needed so a route is
guaranteed but takes more time to form. Proactive protocols feature low latency because
routes are formed continually, but routes are not guaranteed because mobility may
invalidate a route between updates. The trade-off between latency and route availability is
a common example of choices that must be considered in the design of a protocol. In
accumulation-based protocols message overhead is added to the transmitted data.
Table-based protocols use separate control messages for route discovery. Other trade-offs
are also possible for achieving goals, such as, energy conservation, and security.
There are many MANET routing protocols. A few appear in Table 2.1, where each
protocol’s respective classification is briefly captured. Notably, Dynamic MANET
On-demand Routing (DYMO) and Optimized Link-State Routing (OLSR) were both
selected by the IETF MANET WG for standardization.
Table 2.1: Selected MANET routing protocols.
Protocol Classification
Dynamic source routing (DSR) [12] Reactive,
Accumulation
Dynamic MANET On-demand Routing (DYMO) [13] Reactive,
Table-based
Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) [14] Reactive,
Table-based
Lightweight Underlay Network for Ad hoc Routing (LUNAR) [15] Reactive,
Table-based
Optimized Link-State Routing (OLSR) [16] Proactive,
Table-based
Destination Sequence Distance Vector (DSDV) [17] Proactive,
Table-based
2.1.3.1 Reactive, Accumulation-based. Dynamic source routing (DSR) [12]
is a very simple ad hoc routing protocol. The protocol is two-phased and its
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route-discovery phase can be described as a flooded route request and directed route reply
from the destination node. The routes are accumulated by the request and forwarded in the
reply. Every request received at the destination triggers a reply message. For example, if
node A sends a route request (RREQ) message destined for C, then node B forwards the
RREQ to node C. Since node C is the destination of the request, node C sends a route
reply (RREP) message with the accumulated route, C-B-A. Node A eventually learns of
the A-B-C route to C and uses this route until it expires or breaks.
2.1.3.2 Reactive, Table-based. Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV)
[14] and Dynamic MANET On-demand Routing (DYMO) [13] are reactive, table-based
protocols. AODV and DYMO are loosely based on the fundamental RREQ/RREP design
of DSR with the exception that the intermediary nodes maintain the routes rather than
forwarding each route through the network. Both protocols are table-based. As a RREQ is
forwarded through the network a reverse path, to the sending node, is recorded at each
intermediary node. When the RREQ reaches the destination, a RREP message is
forwarded along the reverse path. As the RREP is propagating through the network each
node records the sender of the reply, thus setting up a reverse path to the destination. The
route discovery phase is complete upon receipt of the RREP at the requesting node. The
DYMO protocol is a simpler version of AODV which removes unnecessary route
discovery procedures. Both protocols fundamentally operate in the same way.
2.1.3.3 Proactive, Table-based. Optimized Link-State Routing (OLSR) [16]
relies on the link-state routing strategy in which every node learns the neighbors of every
other node in the network. OLSR uses multi-point relays (MPRs) to improve performance
by decreasing the number of broadcasting nodes. MPRs are responsible for forwarding
data on behalf of other nodes. Only MPRs can forward packets, which limits the number
of nodes broadcasting and minimizes the amount of flooding in the network. OLSR is
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proactive so it is continually performing the route discovery phase of the two-phased
process.
The OLSR protocol is of particular interest in this research because it is both
proactive and table-based. In the context of security and verification only reactive,
accumulation-based protocols have been thoroughly studied, a few researchers have
examined reactive, table-based protocols, e.g., Wibling [15] examines LUNAR, but there
is no similar literature for proactive, table-based routing protocols. OLSR is used as a case
study for this research, and for this reason the details of the protocol are thoroughly
examined in the remaining part of this section.
At the core of the Optimized Link-State Routing (OLSR) protocol’s function is the
definition of neighbors, two-hop neighbors, and multi-point relay (MPR) sets. A neighbor
is defined as a node within transceiver range of another node. Two-hop neighbors are the
neighbors of a neighbor. A multi-point relay (MPR) set is a set of neighbors requesting the
current node to relay data to its neighbors. The MPR set provides a path from a node to its
two-hop neighbors. A goal in OLSR is to distribute MPR sets to all nodes in the network.
If every node has accurate and complete MPR and neighbor sets then optimal route
selection is possible between every node. OLSR’s operation can be divided into two
general processes: neighbor sensing and topology control, both run concurrently. A third
process, MPR Selection, is the process of selecting relaying nodes and is part of the
neighbor sensing process. Each node maintains internal state variables for these three
processes as shown in Table 2.2.
During neighbor sensing HELLO messages are generated by all participating nodes.
HELLO messages traverse only one wireless link, i.e., a single hop. Table 2.3 contains the
information that every node uses in a HELLO message. A node which has not discovered
any neighbors will periodically transmit an empty HELLO message. When a HELLO
message is received the information it contains is added to the receiving node’s Neighbor
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Table 2.2: OLSR Fields Maintained by Each Node
Field Purpose
Neighbor Sensing Data from HELLO messages
Neighbor Set One-hop neighbors
Two-hop Neighbors Two-hop neighbors
MPR Set Nodes to relay for
MPR Selection Set Nodes selected as MPRs
MPR Selectees Nodes selected as relays
ANSN Freshness of MPR Set
Topology Control Topology related data
Origin Reachable destination
MPR Selectors Nodes selecting origin as relay
ANSN freshest MPR data
Set, shown in Table 2.2. If this information changes a node’s Neighbor Set, then a new
HELLO message is transmitted by the receiving node. Eventually, through HELLO
messaging, every node learns of its neighbors and two-hop neighbors. Each node selects
which of its neighbors should forward data on its behalf, which is the MPR selection
process. Subsequent HELLO messages inform a node if it has been selected using the
MPR Selection Set field of the HELLO message.
Table 2.3: OLSR HelloMessage Format
Field Purpose
Origin HELLO originator
Neighbors One-hop neighbors
MPR Selection Set Neighbors selected as MPRs
Shorthand: <{n},{mpr},Source>
The shorthand in Table 2.3, < {n}, {mpr},Source>, provides the format of the message
used in the abstracted model. Relative to the Source, {n} is the set of neighbors and {MPR}
is the set of selected MPRs. This notation is used in Figure 2.2.
During topology control, a node selected as an MPR broadcasts a topology
control (TC) message with the structure described in Table 2.4. The MPR field contains
the identifiers of all nodes which have selected the Origin (i.e., the node generating the TC
message) as a relay. The advertised neighbor sequence number (ANSN) field is used to
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determine the freshness of a TC message. Nodes will only use a TC message if the ANSN
is greater than that of any previously received ANSN for the same Origin. If the time to
live (TTL) is greater than zero, then any node with a non-empty MPR Selector Set must
forward a received TC message after decrementing its TTL. Using this forwarding rule
TC messages spread through the whole network if the initial TTL is large enough (i.e.,
greater than the number of nodes in the network). Finally, the source field denotes the
node from which the TC message was last received. As a matter of style, topology control
always refers to the process and TC always refers to the message.
Table 2.4: OLSR Topology Control (TC) Message Format
Field Purpose
Source Last node to forward TC
Origin TC message originator
MPRs of Source Selected MPRs of origin
ANSN Maintain freshest MPR
Time To Live (TTL) Limits TC life-time
Shorthand: < {s}, ansn, ttl,Source,Origin>
The notation < {s}, ansn, ttl,Source,Origin> below Table 2.4 is shorthand for the
data exchanged in the abstracted TC messages. The {s} field is the set of nodes which have
selected Origin as a mutlipoint relay. This shorthand appears in Figure 2.2.
MPR selection is triggered whenever a node receives new information from a
HELLO message. The goal of the selection process is for the selector to maintain a
minimal set of neighbors which guarantees all two-hop neighbors are reachable. If the
selection results in a change to the node’s MPR Selectees, then subsequent HELLO
messages are sent with the changes. Upon a node receiving a HELLO message, if the
message’s MPR Selection Set contains the current node’s identifier, then the node adds the
message’s Origin to its Topology Control Origin field. This last step alerts a node that it
has been selected as an MPR.
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Minimal MPR selection is important in respecting the two most important wireless
resources: the transmission medium and battery power. If every neighbor is always
selected as an MPR, then repeated collisions occur on the transmission medium and every
node wastes energy in transmitting redundant messages. This complete selection is no
better than simple flooding, but minimal MPR selection is NP-complete [18]. There is no
known polynomial time algorithm for computing a minimal MPR set. Polynomial time
algorithms can only provide estimates of the minimal set, known as heuristics.
For the purposes of this research, the default MPR selection heuristic of OLSR is
employed. Several other heuristics are available, but this particular one is prescribed in
RFC 3626. Listing 2.1 presents the heuristic. Any MPR selection strategy could be
employed but the research goal is to analyze security properties rather than protocol
efficiency.
A shortest path algorithm computes the routing table using the information obtained
through topology control. Topology control need not be complete to run the algorithm, but
until it is complete the shortest path is not necessarily available. Assuming a static
topology, the routing table eventually becomes complete for every node in the network.
The routing table is maintained as a standard link-state routing table.
An example of the OLSR protocol in operation is captured in Figure 2.2. The
scenario refers to the physical topology in Figure 2.1 where node v0 is in range of v1 and
v1 is in range of v2. The nodes in OLSR operate asynchronously, therefore the exact
ordering of events shown is only one possible ordering. For more details on OLSR’s
behavior refer to RFC 3626 [16].
v1v0 v2
Figure 2.1: Simple three node topology, T=5.
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Listing 2.1: MPR Selection Algorithm [16].
1 s e t N2 [ n ] , n e i g h b o r ;
2
3 s e t MPR Selec t ion ( s e t ans , i n t s r c )
4 s e l e c t e e = ∅ ; / ∗ ( i ) Remove a l l e n t r i e s from s e l e c t e e ∗ /
5 ans = ans \ i d ; / ∗ ( i i ) Exc lude y o u r s e l f from MPR ( s e l e c t e e ) ∗ /
6
7 N2 [ r s r c ] = N2 [ s r c ] | ans ; / ∗ M a i n ta i n N2[ s r c ] ∗ /
8 s e t myN2 = ∅ ;
9
10 / ∗ ( i i i ) Exc lude a l l N from MPR −− n e i g h b o r may change on e x e c u t i o n ∗ /
11 f o r e a c h ( i ∈ N )
12 N2 [ i ] = N2 [ i ] \ n e i g h b o r ; / ∗ E l i m i n a t e unneeded 2−hops ∗ /
13
14 f o r e a c h ( i ∈ N ) / ∗ ( 3 ) add a l l i i n N w i t h a u n iq ue l i n k ∗ /
15 i f ( | ( N2 [ i ] \
⋃
j,i ( N2 [ j ] ) ) | > 0)
16 s e l e c t e e = s e l e c t e e ∪ i ;
17
18 f o r e a c h ( i ∈ N )
19 i f ( i ∈ selectee )
20 myN2 = myN2 ∪ N2 [ i ] ;
21
22 w h i l e ( | (
⋃N
i N2 [ i ] ) \ myN2 | > 0) / ∗ ( 4 ) Cover a l l N2 ∗ /
23 i n t maxI = 0 ; / ∗ ( 4 . 2 ) MPR S e l e c t i o n H e u r i s t i c ∗ /
24 i n t maxV = |N2 [ 0 ] | ;
25 f o r l o o p ( j = 1 ; j >= n−1; j ++)
26 i f ( |N2 [ j ] | > maxV)
27 maxI = j ;
28 maxV = |N2 [ j ] | ;
29 s e l e c t e e = s e l e c t e e ∪ maxI ;
30 myN2 = myN2 ∪ N2 [ maxI ] ;
To keep the walk-through of Figure 2.2 as concise as possible, several abbreviations
and conventions are adopted. Most notation conforms to standard set notation but there
are some exceptions:
• The subscript i in HELLOi and TCi is strictly for clarity, in OLSR messages are
distinguished only by their contents and transmission order.
• The symbol Rx msg means the current node receives the message msg.
• The symbol Tx msg means the current node transmits message msg.
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• The symbol→ reads, “it follows that.”
• The symbol vi.s represents the MPR Selector Set of node vi.
• The symbol vi.mpr represents the MPR Set of node vi.
• The symbol vi.n represents the neighbors of node vi.
• The symbol vi.n2 represents the two-hop neighbors of node vi.
• The symbol id represents the address or identifier of the current node.
• The symbol helloi.src represents the origin of the message helloi.
• The symbol vi.tc represents all topology control information known by vi.
• The statement x changed (x unchanged) means elements were added or removed
from set x (set x is unchanged).
• The statement ignore x means that element x is not considered. The statement
usually appears because the element, x, is the address of the current node.
Upon completion of neighbor sensing, topology control builds complete knowledge
of MPRs throughout the network for each node. Topology control runs concurrently with
neighbor sensing, but both processes are separated in Figure 2.2 for clarity. An OLSR
model must consider the concurrent exchange of HELLO and TC messages.
Neighbor sensing requires the exchange of six HELLO messages and topology
control requires only one TC message for the small three-node network depicted in Figure
2.1. When considering all possible concurrent exchanges of TC and HELLO messages the
number of possible states explodes leading to the difficulty of formal verification.
2.2 MANET Security
Traditionally, security entails the need of providing confidentiality, integrity, and
availability (CIA). Providing confidentiality and integrity in the layers above the network
layer has been heavily researched. Many methods for providing secure services are widely
accepted. For example, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is a solution that provides
confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation on user data. Despite the relevance of
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——————–HELLO Messaging——————–
Node v0: v0.n = ∅; Tx hello1 :< ∅, ∅, v0 >
Node v1: Rx hello1; hello1.src /∈ n → v0 ∪ n;
hello1.n = ∅ → n2 not changed→ no changes
to v1.mpr or v1.s; v1.n changed → Tx hello2:
< {v0}, ∅, v1 >
Node v0: Rx hello2; hello2.src /∈ v0.n → v1 ∪
v0.n; hello2.n = {v0}, id=v0 → v0.n2 not
changed → no v0.mpr changes; hello2.mpr =
∅ → no changes to v0.s; v0.n changed
→ Tx hello3: < {v1}, ∅, v0 >
Node v2: Rx hello2; hello2.src /∈ v2.n → v1 ∪
v2.n; hello2.n = {v0}, id=v2 6= v0 → v0 ∪
v2.n2; v1∪v2.mpr (reach-ability to v0); hello2.mpr =
∅ → no change to v2.s; v2.n and v2.mpr changed
→ Tx hello4: < {v1}, {v1}, v2 >
Node v1: Rx hello3;hello3.src ∈ v1.n → v1.n is
unchanged; hello3.n = {v1}, id=v1 → v1.n2
not changed→ v1.mpr not changed; hello3.mpr =
∅ → v1.s not changed; v1 enters idle state
Node v1: Rx hello4;hello4.src /∈ v1.n → v2 ∪
v1.n;hello4.n = {v1}, id=v1 → v1.mpr not
changed; hello4.mpr = {v1} → v1 ∪ v1.s; v1.n
changed → Tx hello5: < {v0, v2}, ∅, v1 >
Node v2: Rx hello5;hello5.src ∈ v2.n, v2.n is un-
changed; hello5.n = {v0, v2}, id=v2, ignore
v2; v0 ∪ v2.n2, v2.n2 remains unchanged; v2 en-
ters idle state
Node v0: Rx hello5; hello5.src ∈ v0.n, v0.n is
unchanged; hello5.n = {v0, v2}, id=v0, ignore
v0; v2∪v0.n2; v1∪v0.mpr; hello5.mpr = ∅ →
no change to v0.s; v0.mpr changed →
Tx hello6: < {v1}, {v1}, v0 >
Node v1: Rx hello6; hello6.src ∈ v1.n, v1.n is
unchanged; hello6.n = {v1}, id=v1, v1.mpr
not changed; hello6.mpr = {v1}, v0 ∪ v1.s;
v1.mpr and v1.n are unchanged; v1 enters idle
state
———————Topology Control———————
Node v1: v1.s = {v0, v2} → Tx tc1: < {v0, v2}, v1 >
Node v0: Rx tc1; v0.tc = ∅ → {v0, v2} ∪ v0.tc
Node v2: Rx tc1; v2.tc = ∅ → {v0, v2} ∪ v2.tc
v_0 v_1 v_2
HELLO Messaging
HELLO_1
<[],[],0>;
HELLO_2
<[0],[],1>;
HELLO_3
<[1],[],0>;
HELLO_4
<[1],[1],2>;
HELLO_5
<[0,2],[],1>;
HELLO_6
<[1],[1],0>;
Topology Control
TC_1
<[0,2],2,3,1,1>;
Figure 2.2: Message sequence chart of an OLSR execution under topology, T=5.
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confidentiality and integrity, nothing can rival the importance of providing availability.
Stajano [8] points out that little else matters if the required system is not available.
Routing information is significantly different than data because it cannot be encrypted and
still remain useful. Routing security can be thought of as the requirement to keep network
paths available for communication. Andel [2] provides a more precise definition of
security:
Accuracy: A routing protocol is accurate if it produces routes that meet its objectives.
Reliability: A routing protocol is reliable if its returned routes are always accurate.
Security: A routing protocol provides security if it preservers the protocol’s accuracy and
reliability in the presence of malicious attackers.
The objective is providing end-to-end communication between two nodes over
existing wireless links. This refined definition of security provides a solid foundation for
security analysis of all routing protocols. Secure protocols use integrity as a tool for
providing security. If the integrity of the route discovery process can be assured then the
protocol must be considered secure.
In examining any network related service it is valuable to relate the services to the
Open Systems Interconnection model (OSI model). Table 2.5 presents which layers are
responsible for securing routing information versus data. This is helpful in limiting the
layers that need to be tested. Each layer builds its capabilities based on the ones below it.
The separation keeps each layer from needlessly complicating the previous layers.
However, the weaknesses of the lower layers propagate into the upper layers. For
example, the physical layer of IEEE 802.11-2007 is easily jammed with interference, and
jamming cannot be overcome anywhere above the physical layer.
Availability is the responsibility of each layer in the OSI model; however, for the
study of MANET routing protocols availability is limited to the physical, data link, and
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Table 2.5: The Open Systems Interconnection model (OSI model) and security.
Application Layer
Presentation Layer Secure
Session Layer Data
Transport Layer
Network Layer
Data Link Layer Secure Routing
Physical Layer
network layers. At the physical layer it is possible for availability to denied by signal
jamming, interference, or congestion. The data link layer can lose availability if a device
subverts the medium access control process. For example, a node that continuously
contends for medium access without waiting the short inter-frame spacing period subverts
the IEEE 802.11-2007’s medium access control. The only difference from interference
jamming is that the medium access denial of service participates in the medium access
control process. Subverting the network layer can occur if a malicious node inserts itself
and controls a link in an active route. The malicious node then has the ability to
manipulate data at any point. For example, the node could drop data. It is not safe to
assume that any layer is inherently secure. The examples provided for the lower three
layers show that each is susceptible to simple attacks. An unavailable network is of no use.
Table 2.6 lists several secure routing protocols with their respective classifications.
Only protocols designed with the goal of security are included. All of the protocols listed
in Table 2.1 have limitations to their security. The broadcast nature of wireless signals
gives attackers the ability to listen to all network traffic. It is possible for an attacker to
inject information that may cause a protocol to make inaccurate routing decisions. The
protocols listed here have been created to prevent this type of attack, but not all of them
provide unconditional protection. The protocols are assumed to function at the network
layer of the OSI model.
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Table 2.6: Pertinent Secure MANET routing protocols.
Protocol Classification
endairA [19] Reactive, Accumulation
Ariadne [20] Reactive, Accumulation
Secure Efficient Distance Vector (SEAD) [21] Reactive, Table-based
Authenticated Routing for Ad Hoc Networks (ARAN) [22] Reactive, Table-based
Secure AODV (SAODV) [23] Reactive, Table-based
Secure Link State Routing Protocol (SLSP) [24] Proactive, Table-based
Secure OLSR [25] Proactive, Table-based
2.2.1 Secure, Reactive, Accumulation-based Protocols. Ariadne [20] and endairA
[19] are both secure, reactive, accumulation-based protocols. The routes in both protocols
contain route information that is constantly changing during a RREQ and RREP. These
changes make it difficult to detect if any routing traffic has been modified or falsely
inserted. Both protocols include signed hashes on every modification to prove that only
trusted nodes are participating in route formation. The endairA protocol adds
authentication to RREQ messages as well. Ariadne and endairA have been analyzed for
their security properties by Ács [19], Andel [2], and Benetti [26].
2.2.2 Secure, Reactive, Table-based Protocols. Secure AODV (SAODV) [23]
incorporates digital signatures for authenticating immutable data fields and hash-chains
for securing the hop-count field. In addition, route error messages are digitally signed and
must be verified before being used. See Appendix B.1 for a detailed description.
The Secure Efficient Distance Vector (SEAD) [21] protocol guarantees an upper
bounded sequence number and a lower bounded hop count of each route. The upper
bounded sequence number ensures that an attacker cannot force destination nodes to
perform an arbitrarily large set of hash operations. The lower bounded hop count ensures
that an attacker cannot advertise a route better than the one received. Bounding on
hop-count and sequence number is accomplished through one-way hash chains. Appendix
B.2 describes SEAD in depth.
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2.2.3 Secure, Proactive, Table-based Protocols. Secure Link State Routing
Protocol (SLSP) secures link-state updates and HELLO messages with public key
cryptography. The link-state updates are similar to the topology control messages used in
OLSR, although SLSP does not include any of the optimizations proposed by OLSR.
Appendix B.3 contains a description of SLSP.
Adjih [25] proposes a strategy for securing OLSR. This strategy, referred to as
Secure OLSR, involves the use of public key cryptography and timestamps. The author
claims the design can be extended to any proactive routing protocols. Secure OLSR is a
natural extension to the OLSR routing protocol, and is used as a case study for secure,
proactive, table-based routing protocols. A detailed description of Secure OLSR follows.
Secure OLSR [25] only differs from OLSR in that two functions are added and a new
message type is proposed. The two functions are verif() and sign(). The function sign()
produces a signature hash of an original message and the originator’s private key. The
verif() function checks that a message corresponds to its signature given the public key of
the originating node. A new message type is defined for sending the signature to each
node. When a control message (TC or HELLO) is received no action is taken until the
corresponding signature is received and this signature authenticates the message. In this
way Secure OLSR can exclude nodes from the network that do not possess the correct
private keys.
Secure OLSR [25] aims to prevent unauthorized nodes from participating in the
network. The protocol assumes that public keys are securely distributed to all participating
nodes. In this research, it is assumed that public keys are known at each node and the
private keys for each node are known only to the respective nodes, unless otherwise noted.
Secure OLSR claims to prevent outsiders from injecting inaccurate routes into the
network.
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Routing attacks are prevented by using a signature mechanism to provide a secure
and unique hash of each message. The signing mechanism, sign(), is represented by
Equation 2.1. The original message is sent in the clear along with the result of sign().
These messages may be sent in two separate messages. Each node in the network stores
the received messages for a short period until the associated signature is received. If the
received signature can be decoded with the sender’s public key then the message is
processed in accordance with the OLSR protocol. The decoding function, verif(), is
denoted by Equation 2.2. Any node, for which a public key is not held, is prevented from
directly adding traffic to the network. The control messages are always sent in the clear,
making it easier for MPR nodes to update the TTL and ANSN fields of TC messages.
Since the TTL and ANSN fields are mutable they are set to the constant value, zero,
before sign() or verif() is applied.
sign(id, k−id,message)→ uniquesignature (2.1)
veri f (origin, k+origin,message)→ {valid, invalid} (2.2)
2.3 Formal Verification
The goal of verification is to prove that a protocol operates correctly with respect to
one or more stated properties. Properties express the operation of an algorithm usually in
terms of some output or state. Two common examples related to routing protocol
algorithms are loop-freedom and secure route creation. A survey of the verification
techniques commonly applied to MANET routing protocols is available in [10].
A verification method must provide some way of modeling an algorithm and a
systematic way of either proving or disproving the desired properties of the algorithm.
The task of verification ultimately should result in a proof of correctness or a
counter-example for the algorithm and property. Methods for finding the counter-example
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are known as model checkers, those for finding proofs are referred to as theorem provers.
In performing the verification of MANET routing protocols it is far more common to find
model checkers.
Model checkers exhaustively search a model of an algorithm for property violations
and provide counter-examples if property violations are found. This method analyzes all
possible states of the system and can be accomplished by a mathematical construct or a
computer program. The algorithm’s model must accurately represent the behavior of the
system. The counter-example is the set of events leading to a property’s failure. The
abstraction required for modeling algorithms is dependent on the model checker, and
usually is a straightforward translation from an algorithm’s procedure.
Theorem provers attempt to provide a proof explaining why a particular property
holds in an algorithm. The proofs provided can be cryptic because the correctness of the
algorithms and their associated properties are modeled in complex, mathematical
abstractions. When using theorem provers the algorithms and properties must be put into a
mathematical form that the prover can interpret. This transformation generally requires
modeling the algorithm in abstract mathematical terms.
2.3.1 Verification Methods. The verification of routing protocols has been
performed in many different ways. Andel [10] presents the categories of non-exhaustive
and exhaustive verification methods. Non-exhaustive verification methods encompass
visual inspection and performance oriented modeling, or simulation. Exhaustive methods
include analytical proofs, simulatability models and formal methods.
Simulation relies on tools such as Network Simulator 2 (NS2), OPNET c©, Global
Mobile Simulator (GloMoSim), and NetSIM. Simulation falls short of actively proving
that a distributed system will perform correctly or as expected. These tools provide
statistical data that enable the comparison of two protocols. An example: protocol X
reliably delivers more packets than protocol Y , therefore X is more secure than Y . This
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statement is not necessarily true because X might deliver zero packets when a discrete
attack or error occurs. In lieu of protocol correctness, most researchers provide extensive
performance analysis through network simulation.
Visual inspection is another commonly used method. In this method, a protocol is
published and attacks and errors are later published against it. Then, a new modified
version of the protocol is published to counter such attacks and errors. Such methods are
prone to oversight because the technique is solely based in human intuition and
understanding of the routing protocols.
Analytical proofs require experienced mathematicians familiar with routing
protocols. Simulatability models require mapping protocols into complex mathematical
formulations, requiring assumptions about a protocol’s operation that may exclude
possible behaviors or attacks in the real protocol. Formal methods come in a variety of
forms from the hand-based modeling of strand-spaces to computer-based model checking.
Formal methods seek to represent a system accurately and provide exhaustive searches of
the system for counter-examples; however, not all formal methods can provide a counter
example when a violation is found.
The set of tools available in formal methods include strand-spaces, the Simple
Promela Interpreter (SPIN), Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and
Applications (AVISPA), Cryptographic Protocol Analysis Language - Evaluation
System (CPAL-ES), process calculus, and petri nets. All of these methods have been
applied in some form to secure ad hoc routing verification. Some of the tools are
exclusively designed for verifying cryptographic security protocols but have been cajoled
into the verification of MANETs. Newer methods for ad hoc network verification have
recently been developed in the form of process calculi. Singh [27] proposes the ω-calculus
and applies it to verify a property of an ad hoc leader-election protocol. Buttyán and
Thong [28] form their own calculus for the verification of secure, reactive,
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accumulation-based routing protocols. Their calculus can be formalized using the
ProVerif tool and used to automatically verify security properties of reactive ad hoc
routing protocols.
For the analysis of a secure protocol an attacker model must be developed that
provides specific capabilities. Andel [2] proposes the concept of applying a Dolev-Yao
[29] attacker. This attack model gives adversarial nodes the ability to listen, inject,
modify, replace, or create routing packets. This adversarial model can be thought of as a
wiretap into a wireless network. Such an adversary may choose to participate in the
routing protocol. A successful Dolev-Yao attacker might be able to advertise a shortest
path between a source and destination, thus controlling traffic over that path. Ultimately,
finding attacks against secure protocols requires accurately modeling the protocol and
thoroughly understanding what an attacker may need to violate security.
2.3.2 Applying Formal Verification to MANETs. Process calculus to refers to the
whole class of calculi that have been derived from the theoretical work initially performed
by Turing [30]. Turing developed what is commonly known as λ-calculus, inspiring the
creation of many other calculi. π-calculus was designed to aid in the verification of
cryptographic protocols. More recently Singh [27] developed the ω-calculus which can be
used to model mobility of nodes in an ad hoc network. This is novel and extremely
beneficial to the field based in process calculus. Buttyán and Thong [28] have extended
Singh’s work by creating a process calculus capable of modeling mobility in addition to
the concept of bi-similarity which can be used to verify security properties of reactive ad
hoc routing protocols.
Andel’s definition of security agrees with that of Buttyán and Thong [28] who
compare an ideally secure network to a network with unknown security properties using
bi-similarity. The basis of their research is to show that an ideal protocol forms a network
that is indistinguishable from the one being analyzed. Buttyán and Thong develop a
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process calculus to support their analysis based on the ω-calculus [27] and π-calculus used
for analyzing cryptographic protocols. This methodology requires the security property, in
this case the bi-similarity of routes, and the protocols to be modeled within the process
calculus. The protocols analyzed are the Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) and Ariadne.
Also, using a bi-similarity, Ács [19] discovered that the Ariadne routing protocol is
actually insecure. Ács provides two exemplary attacks against Ariadne that show an
adversary advertising a false route which the protocol accepts. Andel [2] is able to
automate the process of discovering this attack on Ariadne. Andel’s approach replaces the
process calculus with a model checker capable of exhaustively searching for security
violations, expressed as properties. The attacks analyzed do not consider node mobility,
and are effective only in specific topological configurations.
SPIN [31] is a widely used logic model checker, i.e., a verification system. The tool
is designed to verify the correctness of distributed systems where several processes are
executing concurrently. The Process Metalanguage (Promela) is used to define models in
SPIN. Processes are the primary abstraction and each process runs concurrently with all
others allowing interaction in interesting and often unexpected ways. For a given Promela
model, SPIN is able to exhaustively explore all possible combinations of concurrent
interaction.
Promela processes can model the behavior of ad hoc nodes. SPIN enables the
concurrent execution of these node models. Andel [2] and Wibling [15] have applied
SPIN to the formal verification of ad hoc routing protocols. Wibling [15] performs
modeling in Promela that includes transitions between topological network configurations.
This approach results in state-space explosion and keeps Wibling from completing an
exhaustive search of security properties on all possible network topologies. Andel [2]
improves upon this SPIN modeling by treating every possible network topology as a
unique verification task. For example, given a five node bi-directional network there are
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1,024 different verification tasks. This technique mitigates the state-space explosion
problem experienced by Wibling. So far, the approach in Andel [2] applies only to
reactive, accumulation-based routing protocols.
The AVISPA 2 project, short for automated validation of Internet security protocols
and applications, provides a framework for protocol validation via separately maintained
tools. The validation portion of AVISPA consists of the tools Constraint Logic-Attack
Searcher (CL-AtSe), On-the-Fly Model Cheker (OFMC), and SAT-based
Model-Checker (SATMC) for performing model checking. The AVISPA project dates
back to 2003 and has been significantly utilized by researchers in the research field of
Internet-related cryptographic protocols. AVISPA is currently being replaced with the
Automated Validation of Trust and Security of Service-oriented
Architectures (AVANTSSAR) project.
AVISPA is similar to SPIN in that modeling is performed through processes. Benetti
[26] applies AVISPA to the ARAN and endairA protocols. In this application Benetti
formalizes specific scenarios from which an attack is revealed. Pura [32] presents the
formal verification of the ARAN protocol with the AVISPA framework. The method in
Pura [32] performs the entirety of the model checking in the verifier, to include
topological transitions. This approach failed to produce results even for three node
topologies. This failure was caused by an exponential increase in verifiable states of the
model. Pura claims the AVISPA framework is easier than SPIN. More research is needed
to further explore the possibility of using AVISPA in formal routing verification. Benetti’s
verification of endairA and the ARAN protocols with AVISPA reveal vulnerabilities
against the invisible node attack. However the verification was performed with only two
topologies and fails to exhaustively explore the search space.
2 http://www.avispa-project.org/
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2.3.3 Promela for MANET Verification. SPIN is selected as the tool of choice for
modeling proactive and table-based routing protocols. See Section 3.3.2 for the
justification of this decision. An overview of SPIN and Promela’s features are now
provided in the context of formal MANET routing verification.
SPIN utilizes several faculties for mitigating state-space explosion. The most
important is design abstraction. It is not possible, or desirable, to model low level aspects
of a system in Promela. A model is best designed by considering the properties of interest
and then building the model to verify these properties. Aside from design abstraction,
SPIN also takes advantage of state reduction and compression as described in Holzmann
[31]. Some of the techniques described are COLLAPSE, for state reduction, and DMA
and BITSTATE hashing for state-space compression.
In a Promela model, limiting the number of processes, number of interactions, and
memory required for each state decreases the overall state-space. Unfortunately, this
requires a trade-off between model detail and model abstraction. The best models in
Promela are also the most abstract; they reflect the semantics of the underlying protocol.
Holzmann [31] encourages modelers to create the most abstract model first and to then
perform verification with the model. If the verification passes (no model property
violations are discovered), the modeler should add more detail and re-verify with the
updated model. This process continues until either an error is found or the modeler is
satisfied that the distributed system has been described in sufficient detail.
Promela and SPIN have several key features that are useful when building ad hoc
routing protocol models. At a high level the features can be divided into the categories of
correctness claims, state reduction, message passing, control structures, and
pre-processors. These key features are roughly presented in this order.
The never claim is an omnipotent process in SPIN which is executed after every
transition in a verification run. This process is able to observe all global and local
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variables of each proctype using remoterefs. The never claim is strictly side-effect free.
The never claim provides Linear temporal logic (LTL), allowing logical properties to be
tested over time. A simpler correctness claim within SPIN is the assertion which functions
just like a C-style assertion.
There are many ways to decrease the size and number of states needed for
verification runs. Variables declared using the hidden keyword prevent the verifier from
tracking their state. Resetting variables to zero tends to reduce the amount of information
a verification run must store. SPIN’s verification engine has a built-in partial order
reduction algorithm which reduces the number of states and the size of those states that
must be verified. This reduction is employed by default in any SPIN verification and may
be augmented with other reductions such as COLLAPSE and DMA hashing, which both
compress the sate-vector, and BITSATE hashing, providing an estimate of exhaustive
verification. Unfortunately, the use of remoterefs is incompatible with never claims and
requires SPIN to forgo the standard partial order reduction techniques by setting verifier’s
the NOREDUCE compiler flag.
Creating deterministic blocks of Promela code, also known as d step, is a very
powerful and tricky tool for reducing verification state. The d step keyword in SPIN
allows sequences of code to execute as indivisible operations. There are two effects of
using d step{...}. The code between the brackets runs deterministically and, more
importantly, the transitions within the code are hidden during verification. The hidden
transitions lead to a huge reduction in the size of the state-space that must be analyzed.
When using d step, jumping in or out of the sequence and message passing is prohibited
by the compiler. Sequences are eligible for d step only if they are self contained, but are
allowed to read and write local variables.
In Promela the datatype chan, short for channel, provides the implementation of
message passing. Send, represented by !, and receive, represented by ?, are two operations
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defined on a channel. The send and receive functions define communication strictly
between two processes. The easiest way to understand a Promela channel is to think of it
as a queue that can only be accessed by one process at a time. The possible operations on
the queue are to either put data on (send:!) or pull data off (receive:?). A channel’s send
and receive operations are random. The last sent item is not necessarily the next to be
received when more than one element is on the channel. If a channel’s buffer is full on a
send operation the sending process blocks until the channel is no longer full. Similarly, if a
channel is empty on a receive operation the channel will block until it is no longer empty.
Channels are initially specified with a buffer size that is a positive integer less than
256. A channel operates in one of two distinct modes which are defined by the buffer size.
When the buffer size is zero the channel performs synchronous communication, otherwise
the channel performs asynchronous communication.
A channel in synchronous mode forces a send operation in one process to be followed
immediately with its respective receive operation in another process. This mode causes the
sending process to surrender its execution to the receiving process, which is undesirable in
modeling ad hoc protocols because it restricts the execution of communicating processes.
For example, if node v1, from Figure 2.1, sends a message, either v0 or v2 will immediately
receive this transmission. If v0 is the first to execute, it has the potential to deprive v2 from
sending any messages by sending a message immediately back to v1 which will respond in
kind preventing v2 from every sending a message that is read by v1.
Asynchronous communication is more flexible. In this mode, two processes can
execute independently because the buffer size is at least one. Assume that each channel
for the wireless medium is set to a buffer size of one. In Figure 2.1, if v1 transmits a
HELLO message, the two processes, v0 and v2, are free to either immediately read a
message from the wireless medium or generate their own HELLO message. Both v0 and
v2 are prevented from sending a message simultaneously because only one message can be
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held in the buffer going to the wireless medium. Neither process may permanently deprive
the other of sending to the wireless medium.
The keywords xr, for exclusive receive, and xs, for exclusive send, are able to
minimize the state associated with message passing. Both xr and xs aid in partial order
reduction of the verifier because it allows the state associated with receiving and sending
messages to be eliminated from specific channels.
Promela violates the traditional concept of loop and conditional structures. Unlike
traditional procedural languages the do and if structures are best thought of as a C-style
switch [1] except that each true case entry has equal probability of being executed and
execution does not fall through to the next statement, see Table 2.7 for a comparison.
Promela’s behavior is abnormal because, traditionally, the first true case is always
executed, whereas in Promela true case may execute.
Table 2.7: C switch statement [1] compared to a Promela if statement.
C switch statement (deterministic) Promela if statement (probabilistic)
switch (expression) {
case const-expr: statements
case const-expr: statements
default: statements
}
if
::bool expression -> statements
::bool expression -> statements
::else -> statements
fi;
The rationale for Promela’s probabilistic control structures is that distributed
processes are not synchronized. A process has the ability to perform some other task
while waiting for data. These same structures are not intended for deterministic control.
34
For example, when v1, of Figure 2.1, sends its HELLO message the wireless medium
process must send a message to every node connected to v1. This operation requires
iterating through the connectivity matrix to determine which processes must receive the
message. It is possible to use Promela’s do structure to achieve this behavior, but this adds
unnecessary complexity to the model. A better solution is to define every possibility as a
separate statement, which will always execute deterministically without abusing
Promela’s notation. A problem with approach this is that the such a model cannot scale to
larger network sizes.
SPIN utilizes the standard C pre-processor by default . The C pre-processor, although
powerful, lacks any functional features; it is typically employed to define key-value pair
substitutions in a program. A more powerful pre-processor, m4 3, is available. The m4
pre-processor provides greater flexibility with built-in support for recursive functions.
Using recursion in m4 it is possible to create scalable control structures and automate
other solutions usually performed by external tools or scripts.
Using the features of SPIN, Ruys [33] lays the groundwork for the wireless medium
in Promela. Originally the process was called a broadcast server process. Andel [2]
further refines this method into a wireless medium server. At its core, the wireless medium
server is the broker for all communications in the modeled wireless network. The server
has the ability to enforce connectivity rules between network nodes. The rules are a set of
links and can be defined in a Boolean matrix.
2.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter the history of ad hoc networking was given. The classifications of ad
hoc routing protocols were presented and several protocols, both secure and insecure,
were introduced. Specifically OLSR and Secure OLSR were discussed in significant
detail. The existing verification efforts for secure routing protocols were surveyed.
3 http://www.gnu.org/software/m4
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Finally, the pertinent details of SPIN and Promela for modeling ad hoc networks were
expressed along with a brief background on modeling a wireless medium in Promela.
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3 Methodology
Verifying the security properties of ad hoc routing protocols can be achieved with a
combination of tasks. The process requires creative thinking and is by no means
formulaic. One task is developing the protocol model. Formal properties must be specified
as verifiable within the model. These verifiable properties may be useful in performing
model validation. Validation of the model is critical to show that it performs in accordance
with the protocol’s specifications and cryptographic assumptions. Another task is to
design an attacker with capabilities that may violate the protocol’s security properties
without violating the cryptographic assumptions. Attack models must be verified in all
potential message exchange and attack interleavings. Following completion of the
necessary tasks, the verifier is run given the protocol model, its security properties, and the
attacker. This chapter develops these tasks into a framework using the Simple Promela
Interpreter (SPIN) model checker. The framework is then applied to OLSR and Secure
OLSR protocols.
3.1 Goals
The goal of this research is to propose and evaluate a framework for the automatic
verification of proactive, table-based MANET routing protocols. The framework will
determine if a protocol meets its intended security goals. If it does, then the framework
generates a specific counter-example. The absence of a failure does not indicate that a
protocol is secure. In building a verifiable routing protocol model there are three specific
principles which drive the design of the final model:
1. Verification of routing security
2. Minimization of state-space associated with verification
3. Obey the protocol specification
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Applying these principles drives the modeling effort toward the goal of creating a
model which is both tractable, in terms of verification, and outputs useful information
about the modeled protocol. Attacks against ad hoc routing protocols are often subtle.
This subtlety can be directly related to apparent non-deterministic behavior. An
appropriate ad hoc routing model must exhibit the same non-deterministic properties as a
physical implementation of the protocol. For this reason it is critical to follow the protocol
specification as closely as the modeling environment will allow.
3.2 Assumptions
Modeling secure ad hoc routing protocols requires several assumptions to be made.
Under these assumptions the formal verification of each protocol can be performed clearly
and concisely. Throughout Chapters 3 and 4 the following are assumed: bi-directional
links, no mobility, no simultaneous transmissions, attacks only add false routes,
cryptography is perfect, and benign nodes have a single identity.
Bi-directional links are assumed to exist between all networked nodes. Under this
assumption a Boolean matrix representing connectivity is always symmetric. In the
physical world bi-directional links are not always formed between nodes. Protocols must
be able to handle cases where a node can receive information but is unable to send
information, or vice versus. Handling non-bi-directional links has the potential to
introduce additional security flaws. For this research only bi-directional link cases are
examined, simplifying each protocol and reducing the set of possible network
configurations.
No mobility of nodes is considered during execution of the models. By their
specifications the models have the ability to handle node mobility; however, exercising
this aspect of each model adds a considerable number of states to the overall verification.
If modeling of mobility is desired for these models, then its implementation must occur in
the model of the wireless medium. By assuming no mobility it is unnecessary to model
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link-breakage considerations that may be part of a protocol specification. The cases
analyzed in this research consist of static link configurations between nodes, known as
topologies. A security flaw one topology may not be possible in another topology. This
static analysis may prevent potential attacks from being discovered, but has been applied
by several other researchers [19, 2].
It is assumed that simultaneous transmissions are handled below the network layer.
Specifically the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11-2007
standard handles simultaneous transmissions with Carrier Sense Multiple
Access/Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) at the data-link layer. The links between each
node are handled at the physical layer. A model, called the wireless medium server,
creates an abstraction for both the physical and the data-link layers. All node
communication is arbitrated by the wireless medium server. The wireless medium server
and protocol models work together to prevent simultaneous packet transmissions.
Only attacks against routing protocols that add false routing information are
considered. All other attacks against the routing protocol fall under the category of denial
of service. This assumption simplifies the definition of security by limiting its scope to
finding the class of attacks that add inaccurate routes to a network. This assumption only
affects the design of the security properties and is highlighted in Section 3.3.1.
Cryptography, alone, comprises an entire body of research. It is assumed that the
standard cryptographic mechanisms used by routing protocols, mainly public key
cryptography, are perfect. In addition, private keys are known by exactly one entity (node)
unless otherwise noted, and all public keys are accurately known by all entities (nodes).
The research goal is not to find flaws in the cryptographic primitives used by routing
protocols, rather it is to find flaws in the ways that these primitives are used.
The final assumption is that every benign node in an ad hoc network maintains only
one identity. This identity is synonymous with a network address and interface. Most
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routing protocol specifications allow for multiple interfaces per node, but this information
is only used for making detailed forwarding decisions. Malicious node models are not
limited to a single identity, they have the potential to use multiple identities and share their
own cryptographic keys between any other malicious nodes. This capability allows
malicious nodes to work together using pre-shared information in their attempts to break
ad hoc routing protocols.
3.3 Framework
The goal of this research motivates a precise definition of routing security. Given the
definition of security a method is required for formally checking if this definition is
satisfied by a routing protocol. Armed with the proper definition of security and a
verification method a framework is designed which automatically performs security
verification on a specific routing protocol model.
The definition of security helps define the strategy for creating two security metrics,
φsubset and φcomplete. The metrics, also known as properties, are not equally applicable to
any protocol. Both assume that the underlying protocols distribute routing information
between nodes. The property, φsubset, is designed to work for any table-based protocol.
The other property, φcomplete, is limited to OLSR-like protocols.
Finally, a framework is presented which accepts a protocol specification and security
property. The underlying verification tool is SPIN. Using the considerations for modeling
MANETs in SPIN (see Section 2.3.3), the formal security verification framework’s design
is presented.
3.3.1 Security Metric. As defined by Andel [2], a routing protocol is secure if the
routes it creates are accurate and these routes are always accurate. In order to evaluate the
security of the protocol, a set of metrics must be implemented based on this formal
security definition.
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In Andel [2], the verification of accumulation-based, reactive routing protocols is
straightforward. Every time a route is received its existence is verified with respect to the
physical network. This check is straightforward because every verifiable route is explicitly
returned in a RREP. Reactive protocols are also simplified because the routing process
terminates. In proactive protocols the routing process exhibits infinite execution. Proactive
protocols also require tables for storing hop-by-hop routing information. Both the infinite
execution and the table-based characteristics make proactive protocols particularly tricky
to verify.
In accumulation-based protocols a rule (assertion) can be placed in the requester
node that verifies all returned routes are physically possible. The verification of
table-based routing protocols is more complex. Table-based routing implicitly stores route
information at every node in the network; therefore, a rule must be executed every time a
node’s routing tables are changed.
Proving correct operation, in proactive or table-based protocols, requires showing
that routes are always accurate from the perspective of every node in the network.
Reactive, accumulation protocols have a specific start and end to route discovery. The start
is the initial RREQ and the end occurs when all RREPs have been received by the
initiating node. For reactive protocols, it is sufficient to verify a property against all
received RREPs. For proactive protocols a verification must show that a property always
holds. In table-based protocols routing information is distributed between every node in
the network, each table is subject to change at any time; therefore, it is necessary to show
that the individual routing tables are always accurate.
There are several potential strategies that can be used to prove that a routing protocol
functions correctly:
1. Source-destination route verification
2. Message flooding verification
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3. Verification that routing tables form a subset of the link topology
Strategy 1 entails assigning one node a source identity and another node a destination
identity, then testing to see if the routes between the source and destination are accurate.
This method was applied in Andel [2] to accumulation-based, reactive protocols.
Unfortunately, the endpoints in table-based protocols do not know the route between a
source and destination. The only way to detect these source-destination routes is to send a
message over them. To apply this technique to table-based protocols it is then necessary to
model a data packet, for modeling the data forwarding phase of the protocol. This addition
adds unnecessary overhead to the verification by requiring a model of for data forwarding.
Implementing strategy 1 adds unnecessary complexity to the verification of table-based
protocols.
Strategy 2 identifies a source node which sends a packet throughout the network. If
the message is received at every node in the network, it is possible to conclude that routes
exist between every node in the network (especially under the assumption of bi-directional
links). In this strategy the routes used for the packet are unknown, making it impossible to
identify if the paths taken by the message are in fact legitimate paths in the network.
Strategy 2 is unable to detect the introduction of inaccurate routing decisions. This
strategy differs from strategy 1 because the flooded packet is common to the route
discovery phase of all table-based protocols. Strategy 2 provides the important ability to
detect when existing routes remain undetected by route discovery.
Strategy 3 relies on the idea that the links formed in a routing table must be a subset
of the links available in the physical network. Throughout the process any time a table is
modified it is checked for accuracy relative to the true set of available links. If the table
state is inaccurate at any point during route discovery, then the protocol has accepted an
inaccurate route, i.e., it is insecure.
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Strategies 1 and 3 can detect the addition of false routes. Strategies 1 and 2 can both
detect when a route is denied. Given these two facts, strategy 1 would to be the clear
choice for verification. However, it is not possible to implement this strategy in
table-based protocols because the actual path is not known at any one node. One feasible
work around is to embed the route taken by a packet. This workaround adds the burden of
modeling message packets. The task of verifying when a route is denied, as in strategy 2,
is unnecessary according to the formal definition of routing security. Therefore, strategy 3
is accepted as the best solution for verifying the security of a routing protocol. The 3rd
strategy applies equally to any proactive or table-based routing protocol. The property,
φsubset given by Equation 3.1, utilizes this strategy.
Let the symbol φi represent the property that route i is accurate. Given N is the set of
nodes in a network, let
φsubset = φi∀i ∈ N (3.1)
Equation 3.1 (φsubset) implies that every route corresponds to some set of physical
links in the network topology and precludes the addition of routes that do not exist in the
network. An attack that injects non-existent routes or links is detectable by φsubset.
A definition of φsubset in terms of set notation is provided in Equation 3.2. The
formulation can provide a metric for determining when fake links are accepted in the
network. Let i.A represent the set of links node i has accepted, and B represent the set of
existing (true) links. If i.A ⊃ B, then at least some routes in i.A are inaccurate. When
i.A ⊆ B all routes in i.A must be accurate, hence:
φsubset =

true if i.A ⊆ B
false if i.A ⊃ B
(3.2)
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An alternative notation for expressing 3.2 is to write |i.A \ B| == 0. The expression
evaluates to true if and only if i.A is an improper subset of B, otherwise the expression
evaluates to false (i.e., i.A is a superset of B). This notation is particularly useful because,
when using bit-vectors, set subtraction (\) can be implemented in constant time with only
bitwise operations.
To form Andel’s definition of security, stating that φsubset must always hold is
equivalent to requiring that an adversary cannot add a fake route at any time. The
expression always is a temporal statement, because it describes the proposition φsubset over
a period of time, in this case always. Linear temporal logic (LTL) provides the ability to
express such statements involving time. Equation 3.3 is written in LTL and reads always
φsubset is true. The statement is false if φsubset ever evaluates to false.
(φsubset) (3.3)
The property φsubset cannot detect all actions of an attacker. Notably, φsubset remains
true even when existing routes are eliminated. An attacker capable of blocking existing
links from use is not detectable by this property. It is the responsibility of the protocol to
work around unusable or non-existent links and deliver traffic if the available links allow.
An adversary has the potential to deny physical links in many ways, but most of these lead
to immediate identification of the adversary’s location(s). A known location enables
targeted kinetic actions against the enemy. Although φsubset does not detect denial of
service attacks it is powerful enough to discover inaccurate routes.
A more stringent property, φcomplete, is used in the validation of the model, as
discussed in Section 3.5.3. This property can determine when existing links remain
undetected. Let the symbol φcomplete represent the property that all neighbors are
discovered and all messages flooded during route discovery (TC messages) reach all
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nodes. Equation 3.4 can be used to show that OLSR builds an appropriate view of the
network. Section 3.5.2 implements φcomplete for the OLSR protocol.
^φcomplete (3.4)
Both φcomplete and φsubset were initially designed with the purpose of verifying
security; however, φcomplete does not accurately test security because it is unable to handle
situations where an adversary forms the only physical link between a network and some
benign node. This situation is depicted in Figure 3.1. The use of φcomplete produces false
security violations when the malicious node, vA, fails to participate correctly in topology
control. The false security violations occur when a node is connected to the network only
through the adversary, vA. φcomplete detects that an MPR was not forwarded beyond the
attacker. This is not a security violation because the adversary does not create an
inaccurate route, yet φcomplete is violated in this situation.
vivAv j vk
Figure 3.1: The malicious node, vA, forms the only link between vi and the nodes v j and vk.
The property, φcomplete, is useful in validation i because it offers a more complete
protocol check, capable of demonstrating that MPR selection is consistent throughout the
network. As soon as an adversary is introduced φcomplete becomes useless.
Validation and security verification are both assisted by φsubset. Thiiss property only
tests to see that the set of MPRs learned at every node are actually possible in the network.
The property follows directly from the definition of security that prohibits the use of
inaccurate routes. Based on the definition of security, there are some results that can be
readily predicted for an attacker which assist in validation of the model. Also, because
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φsubset matches the definition of security it is natural to use this property in security
verification.
3.3.2 Selecting the Verification Tool. Of the security verification methods
available, see Chapter 2, formal methods is the most appropriate to use with ad hoc
networks. This follows because formal methods have the ability to detect subtle errors in a
distributed system. There is a broad range of tools available for executing the formal
methods approach.
The selected formal method must provide enough generality to capture the
specification of any ad hoc routing protocol, be strict enough to avoid common errors, and
be flexible enough to avoid unnecessary implementation level details. These three criteria
preclude formal methods based in process calculus and strand-spaces because they are too
abstract to avoid common errors. The immediate problem being that these two methods
rely heavily on mathematical assumptions about the environment that cannot be tested.
The types of formal methods we choose to examine are those that enforce a structured
grammar. It is this limitation that allows the specification of a protocol to avoid common
errors.
SPIN [31] is a tool based in formal methods that is designed to provide an exhaustive
verification of distributed systems. Ad hoc networks are a form of a distributed system
and some researchers have applied SPIN in proving limited properties about specific ad
hoc routing protocols. Section 2.3.2 provides a review of research applying SPIN to ad
hoc networking. Process calculi provide proof systems with the opposite goal of SPIN.
SPIN has advantages over Buttyán and Thong’s [28] process calculus:
• SPIN allows models near implementation level rather than requiring abstract
mathematical models.
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• SPIN’s verification process is exhaustive, the use of Büchi automata aid in partial
order reduction of the model’s state. In process calculi the models properties cannot
be partially proven.
• SPIN’s modeling environment provides an intuitive relationship to the distributed
process associated with ad hoc protocols. Again compare this to the abstract models
required for process calculus.
Only AVISPA and SPIN can meet the research goal. SPIN’s design abstraction, state
reduction, and state-space compression techniques have made it possible to verify the
properties of at least five node reactive, accumulation-based routing protocols. SPIN has
several clear advantages over AVISPA:
• SPIN is very mature and has been in development since 1989 whereas AVISPA was
developed in 2003.
• SPIN is designed with the goal of modeling and verifying distributed systems
whereas AVISPA’s core tools have been designed specifically for cryptographic
analysis.
• SPIN is maintained as a single unified tool, versus AVISPA’s use of the CL-AtSe,
OFMC, and SATMC tools.
• SPIN has several state-space reduction techniques built-in which can be invoked
when exhaustive verification fails. This process is in contrast to the push-button
verification scheme boasted by the AVISPA project.
SPIN also provides functionality for LTL which is necessary for capturing the
time-based variation of φsubset and φcomplete. In SPIN this functionality is achieved through
the use of the never claim (see Section 2.3.3). The claim examines the state of every
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process in the model and determines if the property holds. By comparing each node’s
routing table to the true network topology it is easy to determine that no extra routes have
been added to the network. The LTL provides the necessary utilities for verifying that the
φcomplete and φsubset properties hold throughout the operation of the protocol. In this way, a
routing protocol model can be completely verified.
3.3.3 Design. The purpose of the framework is to verify security of a routing
protocol, in other words, that nodes learn only accurate routes and that those routes are
always accurate. This can be achieved by encoding a model in a context that supports the
security verification. Three major inputs to the model are the network’s connectivity
graph, T , a specific attacker model, A, and the correctness property, φ. The output is FAIL
if a security violation occurs for the set of inputs. An output of PASS implies only that the
protocol is secure for the given set of inputs. With an output of FAIL, the verifier produces
a trail file containing the states and transitions that cause the violation. Figure 3.2 depicts
this framework given the model, M.
PASSFAIL
m4→Promela
A
Secure.trail
M
φ ∈ ΦT
SPIN
Verifier (PAN)
Figure 3.2: Framework for model verification.
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Table 3.1: Bit String Format, N=4
Binary Digit 5 4 3 2 1 0
Edge v2 − v3 v1 − v3 v0 − v3 v1 − v2 v0 − v2 v0 − v1
The two properties φsubset and φcomplete both are elements of Φ. Other properties may
be added to Φ for use in verification. The function topo(T ), see Listing 3.1, maps the input
T to the appropriate network topology. The input A is manually mapped to a set of attack
vectors.
The structure of T is adapted from [34], where a network topology is stored as an
integer. Each binary digit of the integer represents an edge in the topology. This encoding
is presented in Table 3.1. Each edge defines a pair of nodes, edge(vi, v j), which are either
connected, 1, or disconnected, 0. This property is expressed in Equation 3.5. Each edge is
bi-directional, as captured by Equation 3.6. No node is allowed to transmit to itself;
therefore, whenever i = j the two nodes are considered disconnected, this property is
defined by Equation 3.7.
edge(vi, v j) ∈ {0, 1} (3.5)
edge(vi, v j) ≡ edge(v j, vi) (3.6)
edge(vi, v j) = 0 if i = j (3.7)
An edge is uniquely mapped to every binary digit of an integer T. The algorithm in
Listing 3.1 provides one such mapping. The resulting array of edges has the properties
expressed in Equations 3.5-3.7.
With Listing 3.1, it is possible to enumerate all potential networks for N nodes. To
achieve this we start by finding the upper bounding topology, T Ω for a network with N
nodes. Given bi-directional links, there are (N(N − 1))/2 potential edges. Edges are binary
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Listing 3.1: Function topo() for mapping T to a network topology.
1 row =0; column =0; n =0;
2 topo ( T ) {
3 i f ( t >0) {
4 i f ( row ≥ column ) {
5 row = 0 ;
6 column ++;
7 } / / Eq 3.5: 0 ∈ {0, 1} and T%2 → {0, 1}
8 edge [ n , n ] = 0 ; / / Eq 3.7
9 edge [ row , column ] = T%2; / / Eq 3.6
10 edge [ column , row ] = T%2; / / Eq 3.6
11 row++;
12 n++;
13 topo ( T / 2 ) ;
14 }
15 r e t u r n edges ;
16 }
(Equation 3.5), so there are 2(N(N−1))/2 unique ways to combine the edges. Finally T Ω is
calculated with Equation 3.8. 4
T Ω = 2(N(N−1))/2 − 1 (3.8)
For the purposes of this research, the number of nodes, N, is bounded. Andel [2]
limited reactive protocol verification to five-node networks. The model described here is
designed to scale up to eight nodes; however, N was limited to five nodes for analysis.
Exhaustive verification has been applied to four nodes, and non-exhaustive verification
has been applied to five nodes. In the OLSR model, four nodes reaches the practical limits
of available system memory (32 gigabytes) for exhaustive verification. When N = 4 there
are 64 potential topologies and when N = 5 there are 1,024 potential topologies. Not all
topologies need to be analyzed due to symmetric properties exhibited by some networks,
see [34] for an explanation. Furthermore, the topologies in an N-node network is a subset
4 T Ω is 1 less than 2(N(N−1))/2 because the lower bounding topology is 0.
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of those in an (N + 1)-node network; therefore, verification of all (N + 1)-node networks
implies verification of all N-node networks.
For a large N, the verifier may never be able to explore all the states in all topologies.
Limiting verification to an estimate of exhaustive verification greatly reduces the time and
memory required to analyze a protocol. Most property violations should be revealed after
exploring only a few possible combinations of states. Upon reaching the first violation,
the protocol is deemed insecure. Security cannot be inferred when the estimated
verification completes because all possible combinations are not explored.
Modeling of the wireless medium in Promela requires a separate process to handle
broadcast communications. This process is used to enforce the physical restrictions of a
wireless topology. Even adversarial nodes are restricted to the topology rules of the
wireless medium. See Section 2.3.3 for the origins of the wireless medium server in SPIN.
The wireless medium server used in this research is depicted in Figure 3.3 and the
associated Promela pseudo-code appears in Listing 3.2. One key difference from Andel’s
server is that the connectivity matrix, con[id], is expressed as an array of bit-vectors
(bytes), rather than a two-dimensional array of bytes. This change alone reduces the
wireless medium’s state-space requirement from O(N2) to O(N). Another change is to set
the buffer size of channels to wm, to wireless medium, and from wm, from wireless
medium, to one. Every node must check that the to wm buffer is empty before sending.
This check is performed as an atomic operation. As a result, a node never blocks while
waiting for a buffer to clear. This restriction allows the sending node to perform some
other action until the to wm channel is clear. This approach further decreases state-space
because the channel buffers are as small as possible, size one, without triggering the
synchronous channel mode.
The m4 pre-processor (see Section 2.3.3) is used to improve the scalability of the
model. Specifically the code for the wireless medium server and associated connectivity
51
Wireless Medium
Visual Representation of Topology: #28
v1
Server
Process
Connectivity
Topology: #28
0 1 2 3
0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 1 1
2 0 1 0 0
3 1 1 0 0
v0v3v2
Figure 3.3: Node v1’s communication is controlled by the wireless medium.
matrix is created dynamically. These two segments of code depend on the number of
nodes which the m4 macro infers from the topology flag T. Also, the definitions of
attackers are referenced at compile time. The flag A represents a specific attack model
which is defined in an associated file, attacks.m4. This file separates the attacker code
from the correctly specified protocol code. Various parameters and capabilities associated
with an attack vector are coded into the file. The use of attack vectors simplifies the
analysis of security by explicitly grouping a set of attacker capabilities and its associated
number of attacking nodes as a single entry.
In order to limit the state-space for of the model several decisions are made.
Throughout the model most global variables are hidden from the verifier because they do
not reflect routing state for any specific node. These variables are declared using the
hidden keyword. In the wireless medium, nodes exclusively send (xs) to the medium on its
input channel. Also, the medium exclusively sends on its outgoing channels (one per
node), which translates to an exclusive receive (xr) for the respective receiving node. Each
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Listing 3.2: Wireless Medium Server Process.
1 chan to wm = [ 1 ] of t y p e { byte , byte . . . }
2 chan from wm = [ 1 ] of t y p e { byte . . . }
3 hidden byte d a t a . . . / / D e c l a r e a l l d a t a f i e l d s
4 hidden byte i d ; / / D e c l a r e i d f i e l d
5
6 proctype Wireless Medium ( )
7 {
8 xr to wm ; / / S e t to wm t o e x c l u s i v e r e c e i v e
9
10 f o r ( i : nodes ) / / m4 : Rpt n x t 2 s t a t e m e n t s f o r a l l i
11 from wm i = from wm [ i ] ; / / Copy from wm [ i ] t o from wm i
12 xs from wm i ; / / S e t from wm i e x c l u s i v e send
13
14 do / / Run s e r v e r p r o c e s s i n d e f i n i t e l y
15 : : to wm ? id , d a t a . . . −> / / L i s t e n form messages
16 f o r ( i : nodes ) / / m4 : p r i n t i f s t a t e m e n t f o r a l l i
17 i f / / I f id −− i ( l i n k ) e x i s t s ,
18 : : I S 1 ( con [ i d ] , i ) −> / / t e s t con [ i d ] f o r node i ( macro )
19 from wm i ! d a t a . . . ; / / t h e n send d a t a . . . t o i , p r o c e e d
20 : : e l s e −> sk ip ; / / e l s e n e x t s t a t e m e n t
21 f i ;
22 od ; / / Rinse and r e p e a t
23 }
node also maintains a set of scratch variables used for temporarily storing received data.
The scratch variables may be used for other purposes, but after use they are always
restored to a null state. The verifier does not have to track the status of a null variable, thus
reducing the state-space. The m4 pre-processor is useful in creating aliases for scratch
variables that reflect the specification’s terminology.
One of the greatest challenges in modeling routing protocols in general is using
efficient data structures. Promela is not a general purpose language so it lacks many of the
libraries that would be considered elementary for most programming languages. Routing
tables can be represented as bit vectors. Each binary digit’s position is reserved to
represent a node’s network address. The least significant bit corresponds to node v0 and
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the nth bit corresponds to node vn−1. The basic bit-vector operations are defined using
Promela’s bitwise operators and m4 macros are used to improve this code’s readability.
An implementation of the Hamming Weight function is employed to calculate the number
of elements stored in a bit-vector (number of bits set) in a constant number of operations.
Also, the bit-vector data-structure allows the modification and reading of data to be
performed in O(1) operations. The number of bits required to represent all nodes is
equivalent to the number of nodes in the network, thus a byte (eight bits) can represent
eight nodes. Bit-vectors completely eliminate the need to iterate over elements for any
operations, significantly reducing complexity and overhead.
Promela’s remoteref mechanism is used to allow a never claim to access each node’s
state without modifying it. The use of remoterefs comes at the cost of abandoning partial
order reduction. A preferred solution, restoring partial order reduction, would be to
declare each node’s state globally with the local keyword. Despite this remoterefs are used
in the modeling effort.
The file, attack.m4, provides a one-to-one mapping between an integer, A > 1, and an
attack vector. A = 1 is reserved for the benign operation of a protocol, i.e., no attackers are
present. An attack vector is defined by a Promela proctype and number of attackers. The
proctype provides a definition of the attacker and its associated capabilities. In general, the
attacker is a specialized node designed to systematically violate assumptions of the
current routing protocol. Some attacker definitions are capable of collusion, meaning they
can work with other nodes in an attempt to violate security properties. An attack vector
can define one or more malicious nodes. Depending on the definition of an attacker it may
or may not collude with other attackers.
3.4 Attack Vectors
An attack vector is defined as a tuple containing the number of attackers, a trust
relationship set, and an attacker definition. An attack vector, A is characterized by the
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Table 3.2: Trust Relationships (T) in Secure OLSR. B = {all node identities}
T C U Description
B {} {} Only trusted identities are present.
B ⊆ T {} One or more compromised identities.
B \ U {} B \ T Both trusted and untrusted identities.
B \ U ⊆ T B \ T One or more compromised and untrusted identities.
tuple A = (Na,T ,D) where Na is the number of attackers, T is the set of trust
relationships, andD is the definition of the attacker.
The attacker definition,D, is limited to providing the same capabilities that are
available to benign nodes. The definition cannot provide an attacker with the ability to
break cryptography based on the assumptions stated in Section 3.2. An attacker must obey
the rules and connectivity of the wireless medium. These limitations do not preclude a
slew of other possible behaviors. For example, two malicious nodes may be designed to
collude with one another and both node’s public and private keys may be shared. These
undefined behaviors allow malicious nodes to form complex attacks against a protocol.
The trust relationship set, T , describes the state of every identity’s public and private
keys in the model. A node’s identity is an element in the trusted set, T, if all benign nodes
possess the node’s associated public key. A node’s identity is in the compromised set, C, if
an attacker knows the private key for the node’s identity. A node’s identity is in the
untrusted set, U, if it is not in the trusted set, T. The tuple (T,C,U) defines a trust
relationship in Secure OLSR. All benign node identities are in T. The benign nodes do not
know which identities are in C. The possible combinations for the tuple T are presented
in Table 3.2. The case where T = {} is not considered because it is assumed that some set
of benign nodes exists and that these nodes have all established trust with one another.
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An attacker’s actions are tested against the protocol. Depending on the actions
available a protocol may lead to the discovery of an unknown attack. It is also possible to
create an attacker such that it recreates a previously known attack sequence. Take, for
instance, the Invisible Node attack [35]. This attack consists of a malicious node that
relays data without modifying it. Due to this behavior otherwise disconnected nodes will
appear to be connected, but the malicious node can, at any point, filter non-control data to
make the link useless. This attack is effective in two cases. The first is if a benign node’s
sole connection to the network is through an invisible node, as shown in Figure 3.4a. The
second is when an invisible node adds an otherwise non-existent link to the network, as
depicted by Figure 3.4b. Cases where the invisible node is unable to add inaccurate routes
are presented in Figure 3.4c and 3.4d.
v0
I
v2
v1
(a) FAIL
v0
I
v2
v1
(b) FAIL
v0
I
v2
v1
(c) PASS
v0
I
v2
v1
(d)
PASS
Figure 3.4: Collection of topologies involving an invisible node, I. FAIL implies I adds at
least one false route. PASS implies I has no effect.
Five attack vectors are formulated in this section. Three of these attacks can be
considered toy attacks because they would be impractical against a network in which no
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Table 3.3: Attacks Against Secure OLSR. Attack Vector: (Na,T ,D): Na is number of
attackers, T is a trust relationship,D is the definition of the attacker’s capabilities.
A Attack Vector D: Attacker Definition
i (0, ({B}, {}, {}),D) An attacker is not defined, all nodes are benign.
ii (1, ({B}, {vN−1}, {}),D) Byzantine node, vN−1, false routes added to own TC messages.
iii (1, ({B}, {B}, {}),D) Modifies received TC messages, all id’s compromised.
iv (1, ({B}, {}, {}),D) Relay received traffic, “Invisible node attack.”
v (1, ({B}, {}, {vN−1}),D) Modifies received TC messages, no id’s compromised.
private keys are compromised. Despite this, these attacks aid in the validation of the
secure protocol model. Two other attacks are more realistic in that they do not require the
use of any compromised cryptographic material. All five attacks have outcomes which can
easily be derived without the verification framework; therefore, the expected results can be
contrasted with the achieved results to demonstrate that the model does the right thing.
Table 3.3 provides a summary of the five attack vectors. A roman numeral is assigned to
each attack vector for reference.
Attack i: Attack i is the benign case where no attacker is imposed on the network.
The vector A = (0, ({B}, {}, {}),D) describes a case where there is no attacker, and the trust
relationship consists solely of trusted, uncompromised identities. This case is of interest
because it shows that the secure protocol functions correctly under normal circumstances.
In fact, Secure OLSR functions no differently than OLSR under attack vector i.
Attack ii: Attack ii is an attack in which a trusted node, containing its own key,
falsely advertises routes in the network. The attack has the effect of adding false
advertisements from itself to any other nodes. This vector is A = (1, ({B}, {vN−1}, {}),D),
thus one malicious node is defined and it assumes the identity of node vN−1. This attack
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requires knowledge of a single trusted node’s private key. This type of attack is commonly
referred to as a Byzantine, or trusted insider, attack because the trusted node deviates from
standard operating procedures in a potentially threatening way.
Attack iii: The vector A = (1, ({B}, {B}, {}),D) details an attack where all trusted
identities are compromised. One attacker is defined that has access to all compromised
private keys. This scenario gives the attacker the ability to change every control message.
The attacker definition,D, limits itself to modifying TC messages which it is assigned to
forward or create by the protocol. This attack describes an attacker that is both Byzantine
and maintains multiple identities, commonly referred to as a Sybil attacker. Since the
safeguard provided by private keys is removed a secure protocol cannot counter such an
attack. This type of attack is extremely difficult to produce in practice because private
keys are generally guarded with the utmost care. This attack is explored because of its
ability to demonstrate the correct function of a secure protocol.
Attack iv: The invisible node attack is a simple, robust attack. Its associated vector,
A = (1, ({B}, {}, {}),D), features the same trust relationship as vector i; however, one
attacker is defined that relays control traffic to its neighbors without modification.
Relaying can add links without knowing any cryptographic material. This attack is an
example of an outsider with the ability to add false routes to the network.
Countermeasures to the Invisible node attack rely on precise positioning and timing
information, one such scheme is described in [36].
Attack v: In attack v, A = (1, ({B}, {}, {vN−1}),D), the untrusted node, vN−1, modifies
and forwards TC messages; however, the node is unable to generate a valid signature for
the new messages because it does not know any trusted private keys. All messages
modified by node vN−1 have a non-valid signature; therefore, all modified control
messages are ignored. Vector v is an example of an ineffective outsider attack against
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Secure OLSR. The attack is useful in demonstrating that the model does the right thing by
preventing such a simple attack.
The attacks discussed in Section 3.4 are specific to the OLSR and Secure OLSR
protocols. Other table-based protocols do not necessarily share the same features. Attack
vectors must be redefined for each specific protocol.
3.5 OLSR Model
Previous verification efforts have only analyzed reactive routing protocols. Verifying
reactive protocols is not trivial; however, the task is certainly less complex than verifying a
proactive protocol. OLSR is a proactive, table-based MANET routing protocol. OLSR
does not provide any security; therefore, the protocol should be vulnerable to any simple
attack that adds a malicious route to the network. Complete specification of OLSR is
available in [16], see Section 2.1.3.3 for an analysis of OLSR. The model of OLSR
presented here will serve as a baseline for demonstrating that proactive and table-based
protocols can be modeled for formal security verification.
3.5.1 Model. Proactive protocols periodically send updates and these updates are
sent indefinitely. Proactive protocols are said to exhibit infinite execution. In the case of
OLSR, HELLO messages are generated indefinitely. Currently the design of the wireless
medium server makes it impossible to model the infinite execution of OLSR. Infinite
execution is prevented in the model by eventually stopping updates. This behavior is
achieved by reaching a steady state. For OLSR, a steady state is defined as the point at
which every node’s Neighbor and MPR Selection sets no longer change. Achieving this
state is accomplished by restricting when a HELLO message can be sent. Steady state is
possible only under the assumption of no node mobility and it maintains the semantics of
the protocol for the purpose of modeling.
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In order to achieve steady state, the model is limited such that only one node is
initially allowed to send a HELLO message. The identity of the initiating node is not
important; however, it must be connected to the network topology. If it is not connected,
then the HELLO is never received by any other node, leading to premature steady state. In
the model, v0 is always selected as the HELLO initiator. 5 Upon processing a HELLO
message a local Boolean flag, say c, is set to true if either the Neighbor or MPR Selection
sets change. The node may transmit a HELLO message as long as c is true. The variable c
is set to false when a HELLO message is sent by the node. With these minor
modifications, the infinite execution of OLSR is mitigated and the non-deterministic
interleaving of messages is maintained.
In the case of the MPR Selection algorithm it is easy to assume that the selected
nodes will always be sorted in the same order. For example, if two nodes have the same
degree then the node with the lower network address is always selected. This last selection
decision is not defined in RFC 3626; therefore, the result of the sort operations is not
necessarily deterministic. To reflect non-determinism, the sort function initially chooses
either the lowest or highest network address when there is a tie. Unfortunately, if there is
more than a two-way tie, no nodes between the highest and lowest values will be selected
as an MPR. Future versions of the model should be modified to reflect such possibilities.
In the OLSR model, the MPR Selection algorithm alone would make any verification
impractical; however, the use of the deterministic code block, d step, removes visibility of
all but the final results of MPR Selection. Similarly, d step can be applied to new and
forwarded TC messages. By delaying their transmission and maintaining a forwarding list
of the TC messages the internal transitions associated with message generation and
processing is hidden. Data are stored in each node’s topology control table. TC messages
in the forwarding list must enter contention for the node’s transmitter and the wireless
5 The physical network topologies are limited to only those topologies in which v0 is connected. This
decision reflects that each node is homogeneous and prevents a premature steady state.
60
medium. The forwarding list slightly increases the state required per node but
significantly reduces the number of reachable states by hiding the transitions associated
with generating and forwarding TC messages.
The model of messages are composed as described in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. Table 2.2
reflects the local state variables in the OLSR model. The state-diagram, Figure 3.5, is
generated directly from a Promela model of OLSR with three nodes. The state-diagram
captures all finite automata states visible to the verifier for each node. On receive (< tc >
or < hello >) and transmit (tc or hello) transitions the model is either receiving or
sending a message from the wireless medium process. A detailed discussion of the
wireless medium process is given in Section 3.3.3.
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Figure 3.5: State machine for OLSR. State numbers are assigned automatically by SPIN.
3.5.2 Model Validation. Validation is a necessary goal for ensuring that each
model accurately reflects the intended protocol. Four resources for meeting this goal are
61
the protocol specification, SPIN in simulation mode, SPIN generated finite automata
diagrams, and SPIN in verification mode.
Each Promela model is based on an author’s description of the protocol. The modeler
makes decisions based on the protocol’s specification. This leads to a basic, intuitive
validation of the model. This form of validation alone is insufficient because the protocol
can be misinterpreted.
The Promela model can be run in SPIN’s simulation mode to strengthen the intuitive
validation. When a model is run in simulation mode a single, random seed is selected
which determines how the model’s communicating processes will be interleaved. During a
simulation the user can select to output the messages exchanged in the system, the
complete state of each process, or any other print statements as needed. A combination of
these outputs can show how the protocol performs with the current seed. A logical
comparison of the protocol’s outputs against the prior expectations validates the model. A
few random simulations, monitoring this invariant, provide confidence that the invariant is
not violated. However, it is important to note that random simulation is insufficient
because it is possible for a different seed to produce a case where the observed behavior
does not hold.
Another, more practical, tool available from SPIN is a diagram of a model’s finite
state automata. Given the finite automata it is possible to map every model decision to one
that would be made by the protocol specification. Figure 3.5 provides an example for the
model of OLSR. Every state transition relates to an action in the OLSR specification.
The strongest tool available for validation of the model is SPIN in verification mode.
Verification allows for the testing of an invariant, such as only nodes with a non-empty
selector set generate topology control messages. Completely validating the model in this
manner would be prohibitive because there are too many trivial properties. However, it is
possible to use a property, for example φcomplete, to validate that the larger goals of a
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protocol specification are met under normal operating conditions. In this validation
process φcomplete is being used to show that route discovery messages reach every node and
that only accurate routes are created, as discussed in Section 3.3.1. For this step the
consideration of the benign attack vector, A = 1, is sufficient to provide validation.
The property, φcomplete, needs to be implemented for the OLSR protocol. There are
two distributed views of the network that can be used for implementing φcomplete. These are
the views provided by each node’s Neighbor and Topology Control sets. Both views
combined form a subset of the existing link topology.6 The verifiable property becomes
that every node: learns all of its neighbors, learns every topology control decision (MPR
set), and that all of the links in these views are accurate.
In Equation 3.9, V is the set of all nodes, i.n is the set of nodes neighboring i, and
con[i].n represents the set of nodes with edges to node i. This property expresses that all
discovered neighbors are in fact neighbors in the real topology. If they are not, then the
node’s neighbor set must be different from the connectivity matrix, con[i]. This property
initially evaluates to false but should eventually, always become true.
A = ∀i ∈ V(i.n = con[i].n) (3.9)
In Equation 3.10, V is the set of all nodes, i.mpr[ j] is the set of nodes selected by j as
MPRs for j, and con[ j] represents the set of nodes with edges to node j. This property
captures the behavior that a node’s MPR set is shared between all nodes in the network. If
no MPR sets are formed, then this property is true. If node j has no neighbors, then
¬con[ j] evaluates to true and j’s topology control status is not considered. Initially,
property 3.10 will evaluate to true because all MPR and Topology Control sets are initially
empty. Once one or more MPR sets are formed the property will evaluate to false. After
6 The network view is a subset because the use of MPRs masks some potential links.
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these changes propagate through the network, property 3.10 should eventually, always
evaluate to true.
B = ∀i ∈ V(∀ j ∈ V( j.mpr[ j] = i.mpr[ j] ∨ ¬con[ j])) (3.10)
The propositions 3.9 and 3.10, can be combined, leading to the final proposition
φcomplete = A ∧ B. This implementation captures the behavior that TC messaging
disseminates the MPR selection information to all nodes in the network i.e., Strategy 2 in
Section 3.3.1. If the MPR sets never provide complete network coverage, then φcomplete
evaluates to false. Using this implementation of φcomplete it is possible to validate OLSR’s
neighbor sensing and topology control. The LTL formula of Equation 3.4 is used to verify
that φcomplete is eventually always true. If this claim is not accurate in all benign cases, then
the protocol model does meet the protocol specifications.
3.5.3 Security Verification. The OLSR protocol is not specified with the goal of
security and it has no security features. The trust relationship, T , associated with the
attack vectors is meaningless, OLSR accepts all nodes as trusted. This blind trust means
that an adversary can easily add false routes to the network.
Using the security property, φsubset, and the topologies T = {0..63}, it should be
possible to show that OLSR is vulnerable. First attack vector i is tested. For this
experiment it is expected that the framework outputs PASS in all cases because no
malicious nodes are used. Next attack vector v is tested. Under this attack the malicious
node vN−1 is expected to easily add false routes, resulting in the output of FAIL in any
configuration where vN−1 is selected as an MPR. The results of these two experiments
affirm the expectations, as shown in Chapter 4.
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3.6 Secure OLSR Model
Secure OLSR is a minimally modified version of OLSR that adds security. The
modifications to OLSR do not change its fundamental operation. Because Secure OLSR
closely resembles the original most of the model features still apply. This version of
OLSR adds two functions sign() and verif() which together form the basis for securing its
operation. Section 2.2.3 provides the details on how these two functions provide security
to OLSR.
3.6.1 Model. A model of Secure OLSR must provide implementations for sign()
and verif(), Equations 2.1 and 2.2 respectively. The implementation forgoes cryptographic
operations necessary in a real-world implementation as long as all nodes, including
adversaries, are bound to the rules of a trust relationship, T . The trust relationship, T , is
defined in Section 3.4.
The ideal implementation of sign() maps a unique value to every {private key,
message} pair. The only way to generate the unique signature is to possess the private key.
Let us define T as the set of trusted node identities, and C as the set of trusted but
compromised node identities, and U as the set of all untrusted node identities. The signing
function can then be expressed in Equation 3.11, where id replaces both the private key
(k−id) and message, and identity represents the true identity of a benign node.
sign(id a,message b)→

a if id == identity
a if id ∈ C
j, j ∈ U otherwise
(3.11)
The implementation of sign() in Equation 3.11 ignores the message field which
means that there is no way to associate the original message with the result of the
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function. The solution is to always send the result of sign() along with its corresponding
message. This solution is allowed according to the Secure OLSR specification.
When a control message, say < origin,message, signature >, is received it is verified
by verif(). If the function call returns “valid” then message is processed in accordance
with OLSR, otherwise the control message is discarded. It is assumed that the message
corresponding to the signature is received in the same packet. Equation 3.12 provides a
model of verif():
veri f (id a,message b, signature c)→

‘valid′ if a == c ∧ a ∈ T
‘valid′ if a == c ∧ a ∈ C
‘invalid′ otherwise
(3.12)
The first case in Equation 3.12 returns valid when a message is received from a
trusted node. The second case in Equation 3.12 returns valid if a message is received that
is using a compromised node identity. In all other cases the function will return invalid.
The modeled implementations of sign() and verif() are added to the OLSR model. To
implement Secure OLSR: Every HELLO and TC message is sent along with the result of
sign(), Equation 3.11. Every HELLO and TC message received is only processed if
verif(), Equation 3.12 returns the string valid.
3.6.2 Model Validation. Validation of Secure OLSR requires showing that the
sign() and verif() functions are implemented correctly. A good demonstration is that attack
vector iii will cause the framework to provide the output FAIL while vector v always
results in the output PASS for the inputs φ = φsubset and T = {0..63}. This result is
expected because iii and v use the same attacker definition, but their trust relationships
differ. In vector iii all private keys have been compromised, vector v has no compromised
keys. The compromised keys allow vector iii to modify control messages and provide the
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corresponding signature. The results of these two validation runs are provided in Chapter
4 and correspond to the expected outcomes.
In addition to validating the two new functions it is also necessary to validate that
Secure OLSR does not affect the original validation. A validation run with A = i,
φ = φcomplete, and T = {0..63} should provide sufficient evidence that the Secure OLSR
model behaves no differently than the original. In this case the output should be PASS for
all inputs. Chapter 4 captures the results which validate Secure OLSR.
3.6.3 Security Verification. Security verification can be performed exhaustively
over all inputs, T = {0..63}, φ = φsubset, A = {i..v}. Any violations of φ will reveal the
counter-example showing the steps leading to the property violation. The state-space
required for the set of topologies T = {64..1023} (i.e., all five-node networks) is too great
for performing an exhaustive verification. As a result, only estimates of the full
state-space search are possible. This non-exhaustive verification is performed by setting
the verifier’s BITSTATE compilation flag. Using the bit-state approximation should reveal
most security violations and provide the appropriate counter-example; however, this does
not guarantee that a violation will be found even if it exists for the specified inputs. The
Secure OLSR model understands the trust relationships, T , provided in the attack vectors.
For this reason attack vectors with no compromised keys should be unable to add false
routes. Any findings to the contrary will reveal an unknown attack against Secure OLSR.
The expected outcomes for each attack vector are presented below. Results for all
scenarios are available in Chapter 4.
Attack i No attackers are defined, the framework should always output PASS.
Attack ii The attacker contains a single compromised identity. With this identity the
attacker generates arbitrary TC messages that contain false routes. Since the identity
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of the attacker is trusted nodes in the network will accept the false routes introduced
by the attacker.
Attack iii The attacker contains compromised identities for all node identifiers. Given
this information the attacker modifies and signs TC messages that it is either elected
to forward or generates to advertise itself as an MPR. Because of the compromised
identities and attacker definition the framework should output FAIL whenever the
attacker node would be selected as an MPR.
Attack iv Although no identities are compromised Secure OLSR is unable to defend
against relay attacks. Such attacks are independent of the current trust relationship
because the malicious node does not attempt to modify any relayed control traffic.
An output of FAIL is expected any time the attacker joins two benign nodes that
share no common links.
Attack v The attacker definition is equivalent to iii but no identities are compromised.
The security features of Secure OLSR are expected to prevent the injection of any
false routes so the framework should always output PASS for this attack vector.
3.7 Chapter Summary
This chapter on the research methodology has presented the goals and assumptions of
the security verification framework for secure MANET routing protocols. A justification
of the framework’s core model checker, SPIN was given. The design of the framework
was presented along with techniques for improving the tractability of MANET routing
protocol models. Finally, both OLSR and Secure OLSR models were built and the
validation and verification strategies were motivated for each model.
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4 Results
A validation and verification strategy was proposed in Section 3.5 for the OLSR
protocol. This chapter presents the results of this validation and verification and compares
them with the expected outcomes. The chapter also provides the results for the validation
and verification of Secure OLSR as discussed in Section 3.6. These results are compared
to the expected outcomes for each experiment.
4.1 OLSR Validation and Verification
Exhaustive verification of the OLSR model for inputs I = {A = i, T = {0..63}, and
φ = φcomplete} returns the string PASS (i.e., no security violation) for all T ∈ T. All benign
network topologies in T are considered secure when no attacker is present. The result
proves that for the verified topologies the model never violates φcomplete; thus, the model
provides the same neighbor sensing and topology control that would be expected from any
node in an OLSR implementation. These results demonstrate that the OLSR model is
valid (see Section 3.3.1).
For the inputs I = {A = i,T = {0..63}, φ = φsubset}, an exhaustive verification is
performed. The framework provides the output of PASS for all I, which is the expected
result since no malicious nodes are introduced. Next I = {A = v,T = {0..63}, φ = φsubset} is
tested. Here, the attack vector, A = v, represents a single attacker that replaces the last
node, vN−1, with a malicious node. This malicious node adds false routes to all TC
messages it forwards or generates. Exhaustive verification over all inputs in I returns FAIL
(i.e., φsubset is violated) under topologies 26, 28, 30, 41, 44, 45, 49, 50, and 51. The
configuration of the failing topologies is generalized by Figure 4.1a. The malicious node,
B, advertises false routes to its neighbors when it has been elected as an MPR by v j or vk.
In addition, v j advertises that it is an MPR for vi but B modifies this advertisement before
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forwarding. The property φsubset detects this because the Topology Control set of vk is
eventually inconsistent with the Topology Control set of v j.
Continuing with input I = {A = v,T = {0..63}, φ = φsubset}, the verification reports
that topologies 57, 58, 60, ... return PASS (i.e., the protocol is secure for the inputs).
Figure 4.1b represents the general case for these topologies. Node B is elected as an MPR
by all benign nodes, and B always modifies this information by advertising that it has a
link to all benign nodes. It follows that vi, v j, and vk have consistent TC sets; therefore, no
property violation is found because B’s advertised routes exist. The failure to detect a
malicious route in this case is acceptable because the goal of analyzing security is only to
show if B can add an inaccurate route to the network.
vi vkv j B
(a) T=26, 28, 30, 41, 44, 45, 49, 50, 51
vi vkv j B
(b) T=57, 58, 60, ...
Figure 4.1: Generic networks where i , j , k and B is malicious.
4.2 Secure OLSR Validation
The attack vectors can be applied in order to show that the model of the Secure
OLSR protocol accurately reflects the protocol’s specifications. Specifically, attack
vectors i, iii, and v are used for model validation against the Secure OLSR specification, as
discussed in Section 3.6.
The attack vectors i and v are expected not to affect the specification’s operation, and
the model should reflect this behavior. Clearly, the cases where attack vector i is applied
will have no impact on the model because no malicious nodes are defined. When vector v
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is applied the model will block all untrusted nodes. Against i and v, the protocol should
behave no differently than it does in OLSR.
Attack vector iii reflects what happens when the fundamental cryptographic
assumption of private keys fail, the expected result is that an attacker can compromise any
node’s routing information. When vector iii is applied, the model will be vulnerable to any
actions of the attacker because it can forge messages for any benign identity. In this case,
the attacker only adds false routes to TC messages. Against iii, the protocol is
compromised and should be completely vulnerable.
With these three attack vectors, it is possible demonstrate that the Secure OLSR
model performs in accordance with its specifications. Attack vectors i, iii, and v validate
the fundamental mechanism used for securing OLSR. Vectors i and v should be thwarted
by the security mechanism; vector iii should fail in some instances because it breaks the
cryptographic premise that private keys are private.
Under attack vector iii, an attacker with knowledge of all private keys is shown to add
inaccurate routes to a Secure OLSR network. With inputs A = iii, T = {0..63}, and
φ = φsubset the verification demonstrates that in a subset of T the attacker successfully
provides inaccurate routes, as shown in Table 4.1. Inaccurate routes are only found in
topologies where the attacker is elected as an MPR. The property, φsubset, reveals that
Secure OLSR is vulnerable to attack vector iii. This result is expected because the vector
violates the premise that private keys are kept private.
In attack vector v, the attacker modifies TC messages before transmission, but fails to
produce valid signatures for the modifications. Since the signatures are invalid all
modified messages should be ignored. The inputs A = v, T = {0..63}, and φ = φsubset are
tested to show that false routes cannot be introduced. The results, in Table 4.2, show that
no inaccurate routes are added to any topologies in T by attack v. From these results it is
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Table 4.1: Verification against attack iii: Omnipotent
T φsubset T φsubset T φsubset T φsubset
0 PASS 16 PASS 32 PASS 48 PASS
1 PASS 17 PASS 33 PASS 49 FAIL
2 PASS 18 PASS 34 PASS 50 FAIL
3 PASS 19 PASS 35 PASS 51 FAIL
4 PASS 20 PASS 36 PASS 52 PASS
5 PASS 21 PASS 37 PASS 53 PASS
6 PASS 22 PASS 38 PASS 54 PASS
7 PASS 23 PASS 39 PASS 55 PASS
8 PASS 24 PASS 40 PASS 56 PASS
9 PASS 25 PASS 41 FAIL 57 PASS
10 PASS 26 FAIL 42 PASS 58 PASS
11 PASS 27 PASS 43 PASS 59 PASS
12 PASS 28 FAIL 44 FAIL 60 PASS
13 PASS 29 PASS 45 FAIL 61 PASS
14 PASS 30 FAIL 46 PASS 62 PASS
15 PASS 31 PASS 47 PASS 63 PASS
concluded Secure OLSR prevents outside attackers from adding false routes for the
specified set of inputs.
Using inputs A = i, T = {0..63}, and φ = φcomplete the verification reveals no
violations. Since every node generates control messages that are signed correctly, then
every node should only receive messages that are valid. Applying φ = φsubset yields no
violations, as shown in Table 4.3. This behavior is equivalent to that of the OLSR model;
therefore, the results show that by implementing Secure OLSR the underlying behavior of
OLSR is not changed. Table 4.3 provides a summary of the results given A = i,
T = {0..63}, and φ = φcomplete and A = i, T = {0..63}, and φ = φsubset.
4.3 Secure OLSR Verification
This section presents the verification of Secure OLSR’s security properties. It is
necessary to define the model’s inputs (A, T , and φ). A is any attacker vector i through v
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Table 4.2: Verification against attack vector v: Outsider
T φsubset T φsubset T φsubset T φsubset
0 PASS 16 PASS 32 PASS 48 PASS
1 PASS 17 PASS 33 PASS 49 PASS
2 PASS 18 PASS 34 PASS 50 PASS
3 PASS 19 PASS 35 PASS 51 PASS
4 PASS 20 PASS 36 PASS 52 PASS
5 PASS 21 PASS 37 PASS 53 PASS
6 PASS 22 PASS 38 PASS 54 PASS
7 PASS 23 PASS 39 PASS 55 PASS
8 PASS 24 PASS 40 PASS 56 PASS
9 PASS 25 PASS 41 PASS 57 PASS
10 PASS 26 PASS 42 PASS 58 PASS
11 PASS 27 PASS 43 PASS 59 PASS
12 PASS 28 PASS 44 PASS 60 PASS
13 PASS 29 PASS 45 PASS 61 PASS
14 PASS 30 PASS 46 PASS 62 PASS
15 PASS 31 PASS 47 PASS 63 PASS
Table 4.3: Verification against attack i: Benign
T φcomplete, φsubset T φcomplete, φsubset T φcomplete, φsubset T φcomplete, φsubset
0 PASS 16 PASS 32 PASS 48 PASS
1 PASS 17 PASS 33 PASS 49 PASS
2 PASS 18 PASS 34 PASS 50 PASS
3 PASS 19 PASS 35 PASS 51 PASS
4 PASS 20 PASS 36 PASS 52 PASS
5 PASS 21 PASS 37 PASS 53 PASS
6 PASS 22 PASS 38 PASS 54 PASS
7 PASS 23 PASS 39 PASS 55 PASS
8 PASS 24 PASS 40 PASS 56 PASS
9 PASS 25 PASS 41 PASS 57 PASS
10 PASS 26 PASS 42 PASS 58 PASS
11 PASS 27 PASS 43 PASS 59 PASS
12 PASS 28 PASS 44 PASS 60 PASS
13 PASS 29 PASS 45 PASS 61 PASS
14 PASS 30 PASS 46 PASS 62 PASS
15 PASS 31 PASS 47 PASS 63 PASS
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defined previously. T is a topology between 0 and 63, and φ is the security property
captured by φsubset. For each combination of these inputs the model verification produces
the output PASS or FAIL. The output PASS refers to the verification that finds no security
violations, and FAIL refers to one in which security violations are found.
The results of Attack i, where all nodes participating in the network are benign, is
shown in Table 4.3. The results, as expected, show that φsubset holds for all possible
topologies. Secure OLSR meets the same routing objectives as OLSR when there are no
adversaries.
When attack vector ii is tested in the framework it reveals a significant number FAIL
outputs. Under attack ii the attacker definition continuously advertises TC messages with
false routes. The only false routes it advertises are from the attack node vN−1 to nodes v0,
v1, and v2. There are some cases when vN−1 = v2. The output of PASS, in Table 4.4, is
explained by two scenarios. The first is when the attacker definition actually advertises
routes that exist, this occurs in topologies 1, 6, and 56-63. The second scenario is when
node v0 is not connected to the larger network, the attacker is ineffective because it cannot
send any control traffic to v0. In this last scenario v0 accurately believes it is an isolated
node. This scenario accounts for all remaining PASS outputs in Table 4.4.
Attack iii shows the case where the attacker chooses only to modify the TC messages
which it has been elected to forward in the network. Some topologies verified against this
attack are vulnerable while others are not, as presented in Table 4.1. Since the private keys
are compromised the attacker is able to modify TC messages that are accepted by all
benign nodes. The same analysis covered for Figure 4.1 also applies in the case of Secure
OLSR.
Applying attack vector iv reveals that 19 topologies lead to an output of FAIL, see
Table 4.5. The attack expressed here is the invisible node attack. The failures correspond
to cases where the invisible node is able to add non-existent links to the network. This
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Table 4.4: Verification against attack ii: Byzantine
T φsubset T φsubset T φsubset T φsubset
0 PASS 16 PASS 32 PASS 48 PASS
1 PASS 17 FAIL 33 PASS 49 FAIL
2 FAIL 18 PASS 34 FAIL 50 FAIL
3 FAIL 19 FAIL 35 FAIL 51 FAIL
4 PASS 20 PASS 36 PASS 52 PASS
5 FAIL 21 FAIL 37 FAIL 53 FAIL
6 PASS 22 FAIL 38 FAIL 54 FAIL
7 FAIL 23 FAIL 39 FAIL 55 FAIL
8 FAIL 24 FAIL 40 FAIL 56 PASS
9 FAIL 25 FAIL 41 FAIL 57 PASS
10 FAIL 26 FAIL 42 FAIL 58 PASS
11 FAIL 27 FAIL 43 FAIL 59 PASS
12 FAIL 28 FAIL 44 FAIL 60 PASS
13 FAIL 29 FAIL 45 FAIL 61 PASS
14 FAIL 30 FAIL 46 FAIL 62 PASS
15 FAIL 31 FAIL 47 FAIL 63 PASS
attack is able to violate the definition of security by introducing false routes. Although,
not all cases lead to a security violation, the attack is effective under certain topological
configurations. Figure 4.2 demonstrates how some topological configurations will lead to
the output of FAIL. In general, the output FAIL occurs if the invisible node adds a link
between two nodes that are not otherwise connected.
When faced with attack v, Secure OLSR ignores all messages signed by the attacking
node because its identity is in the set of untrusted nodes (vN−1 ∈ U). The verification run
against this attack vector demonstrates the expected result that v is an ineffective attack.
Table 4.2 shows that the protocol is not vulnerable to attack vector v for the set of
topologies examined. This result was expected under this attack and demonstrates that
Secure OLSR adds security for the set of inputs examined.
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Table 4.5: Verification against attack iv: Invisible node
T φsubset T φsubset T φsubset T φsubset
0 PASS 16 PASS 32 PASS 48 PASS
1 PASS 17 PASS 33 PASS 49 FAIL
2 PASS 18 PASS 34 PASS 50 FAIL
3 PASS 19 PASS 35 PASS 51 FAIL
4 PASS 20 PASS 36 PASS 52 PASS
5 PASS 21 PASS 37 PASS 53 PASS
6 FAIL 22 PASS 38 PASS 54 PASS
7 PASS 23 PASS 39 PASS 55 PASS
8 PASS 24 FAIL 40 FAIL 56 FAIL
9 PASS 25 PASS 41 FAIL 57 FAIL
10 PASS 26 FAIL 42 PASS 58 FAIL
11 PASS 27 PASS 43 PASS 59 FAIL
12 PASS 28 FAIL 44 FAIL 60 FAIL
13 PASS 29 PASS 45 FAIL 61 FAIL
14 PASS 30 FAIL 46 PASS 62 FAIL
15 PASS 31 PASS 47 PASS 63 PASS
v0
I
v2
v1
(a) FAIL
v0
I
v2
v1
(b) FAIL
v0
I
v2
v1
(c) PASS
v0
I
v2
v1
(d)
PASS
Figure 4.2: Collection of topologies involving an invisible node, I. FAIL implies I adds at
least one false route. PASS implies I has no effect.
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4.4 The Subtlety of Attacks
In the analysis of the invisible node attack, vector iv, it would be insufficient to
randomly pick a few topologies to verify. For example, had topologies 31 and 37 (Figure
4.2c and 4.2d) been selected the results would show that the invisible node had no impact.
Instead, it is necessary to examine every topology to show which are vulnerable. For
attack vector iv an obvious rule can be stated: if vI is a neighbor of two or more nodes
which do not share a link, then the attacker adds a false route. The rule for the invisible
node attack is easily derived even without the verification of the Secure OLSR model. The
important result is that attacks do not apply equally in all network topologies. New attacks
may not lend themselves to such simple rules; therefore, it is essential for the verification
framework to examine all possible node configurations.
The attack vector ii causes property violations in all topologies verified. The vector
demonstrates that if just one private key is compromised, or there is no security, then any
configuration can be forced to accept inaccurate routes. A less obtrusive attack vector
(e.g., vector iii) limits the attacker, allowing it to only modify TC messages which it is
responsible for forwarding. The results of such an attack are shown in Table 4.1. In
configurations where the malicious node, vA, is selected as an MPR by at least one node
the property, φsubset, is violated. Recall that MPR selection is non-deterministic. It follows
that the attack will not work in network scenarios where vA is not elected as an MPR. An
unsuccessful example of this attack is illustrated in Figure 4.3a. Figure 4.3b provides an
example of a successful attack. These examples are different because 4.3a did not select
vA as an MPR whereas 4.3b did. The attacker must be selected as the MPR to be
successful, so the attack succeeded in this instance. Two SPIN simulations provided these
different results under the same inputs. See Appendix A.2 and A.3 for the full message
sequence charts associated with Figures 4.3a and 4.3b. This analysis underscores the need
to perform exhaustive verification when searching for security flaws in a distributed
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system. The automatic discovery of attacks against secure, table-based protocols is
dependent on the ability to exhaustively search a protocol’s possible interactions in order
to disclose subtle sequences that lead to property violations.
v0
v1
v2 vA
(a) Network view is accurately built,
despite attack vector iii.
v0
v1
v2 vA
(b) The link v1-v0 is an inaccuracy added
by attack vector iii.
Figure 4.3: Topology #30, under attack vector iii, in two separate simulation results.
4.5 Chapter Summary
The results of the validation and verification experiments designed in Chapter 3 were
tested. These results demonstrate that the OLSR and Secure OLSR models correctly
reflect their specifications. No new attacks were revealed by applying the automatic
verification framework; however, the verification under the set of existing attacks proves
that the framework has the ability to detect subtle errors in proactive, table-based routing
protocols.
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5 Conclusions
The prevalence of wireless communications makes it a low hanging fruit for
innovative products as well as unscrupulous hackers with malicious intent. This research
advances the state of an automated verification framework into the realm of proactive ad
hoc routing protocols. Although no method may ever be able to prevent the subversion of
routing protocols, it is very important to understand the security vulnerabilities that exist.
5.1 Research Problem
In today’s network applications, end-to-end security is often achieved through public
key encryption. At this level, however, the only guarantees that can be made are that a
user’s data is unmodified, remains private, or both. Application level security cannot
guarantee the delivery of data. Thus, at the routing protocol layer a different level of
security must be introduced to protect availability. This need is especially true in wireless
networks like MANETs.
Attacks against routing in MANETs are often subtle because of the wide range of
actions that an attacker may employ. For example, a relaying attack allows an adversary to
take control of data paths by simply causing a shorter path to be advertised through it. An
important step to preventing attacks against a wireless routing protocol is to understand
the possible attack avenues and the particular attack sequences that are available to an
attacker.
5.2 Contributions
This research provides a modeling framework capable of exhaustively verifying
security properties in MANET table-based routing protocols. The research directly
extends a similar framework developed in Andel [2].
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Specifically, this framework adds support for table-based protocols, and in doing so
advanced several formal methods modeling concepts for MANETs. Linear temporal logic
was added, and scalability was improved with the use of the macro processor m4. The
concept of the wireless medium was improved with greater scalability, tractability, and
abstraction. Finally, the universal, table-based verification property, φsubset, was developed
and it is suggested that this property can be used in the verification of all table-based
protocols.
LTL is introduced to the framework and enables a property to be evaluated in all steps
of execution, this is the first application of LTL to secure, table-based routing protocols.
The macro processor m4 is applied to the framework and provides size scalability, greater
expressiveness, and adaptable attack vectors. The use of m4 removes verification
dependence on external tools or scripting languages and centralizes the modeling code.
The wireless medium concept is further developed to improve the abstraction,
tractability, and size scalability. Specifically the wireless medium server is designed such
that it can be used for modeling any ad hoc routing protocol. This is valuable because new
protocols will not rely on the implementation of the wireless medium model.
Verification of Secure OLSR against several attack vectors confirms the findings of
previously discovered attacks. Although the verification framework did not reveal any
undiscovered attacks against Secure OLSR, this does not mean that no other attacks
against the protocol exist. It only means that the attack vectors, topologies, and properties
tested did not reveal any unknown attack sequences.
5.3 Future Work
The framework presented here is an extension into the realm of proactive ad hoc
routing protocols. This research has exposed many more avenues of research needed for
the automatic verification of secure routing protocols.
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Several of the advances developed are directly applicable to the prior research in
accumulation-based, reactive routing protocols. For example, the use of m4 can be used to
improve scalability and improve the readability of the Promela models. The wireless
medium changes can also be applied to greatly reduce the state-space required in
verification runs. Applying the concepts learned in this research would allow the
framework developed in Andel [2], to be applied to networks containing many more
nodes.
A clear path forward with this framework is to apply it to other secure, table-based
protocols such as SLSP and SAODV. In the case of on-demand protocols the property,
φsubset, is still applicable. It may even be desirable to force all nodes in table-based routing
protocols to send route requests. The final decision is, however, in the hands of the
designer.
Proactive, table-based protocols can now be modeled for exhaustive verification. The
next logical step is to add support for secure hybrid protocols. Hybrid protocols utilize
both reactive and proactive routing strategies in a single protocol.
Although great improvements were made in the wireless medium, its current
implementation may be improved. One improvement is to remove the limitation that
imposes finite execution sequences.
The verifications never found any undiscovered attack sequences in Secure OLSR.
This absence is not to say that an undiscovered attack does or does not exist. More
sophisticated attack vectors need to be defined. These attack vectors must assume that no
cryptographic material is compromised and will be more advanced than relay attacks. A
successful attack vector may incorporate relaying and other mechanisms to attempt to
trick the protocol into accepting false routes. If, for example, an adversary is able to trick
another node into signing a message on its behalf then several possible attacks may
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become possible. These attack vectors can then be used to automatically discover the
associated attack sequences and their applicable topologies.
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Appendix A: Message Sequence Charts
A.1 Description
The following message sequence charts describe the series of messages exchanged
between nodes. Section A.2 shows how the configuration of topology 30 leads to an
inaccurate routing decision as discussed in Chapter 4. Section A.3 demonstrates a
sequence of events where attack vector iii fails to affect the appropriate routing decisions
for topology 30.
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0 1::init:0:never_1
1 #682
6 1:Wireless_Medium
8 2:Node
11 to_wm!HELLO,0,0,0,0,0,0,0
13 to_wm?HELLO,0,0,0,0,0,0,0
19 from_wm_2!HELLO,0,0,0,0,0,0
21 from_wm_3!HELLO,0,0,0,0,0,0
23 3:Node
27 4:Node
31 from_wm_local?HELLO,0,0,0,0,0,0
35 to_wm!HELLO,2,2,1,0,0,0,2
37 to_wm?HELLO,2,2,1,0,0,0,2
39 from_wm_0!HELLO,2,1,0,0,0,2
41 from_wm_1!HELLO,2,1,0,0,0,2
47 from_wm_local?HELLO,2,1,0,0,0,2
51 to_wm!HELLO,1,1,4,4,0,0,1
53 from_wm_local?HELLO,2,1,0,0,0,2
56 to_wm?HELLO,1,1,4,4,0,0,1
62 from_wm_2!HELLO,1,4,4,0,0,1
65 from_wm_local?HELLO,1,4,4,0,0,1
66 + tc_selector@2: [0 0 2 0 ]

69 to_wm!HELLO,2,2,3,0,0,0,2
71 5:ByzNode
73 from_wm_local?HELLO,0,0,0,0,0,0
78 from_wm_3!HELLO,1,4,4,0,0,1
80 from_wm_local?HELLO,1,4,4,0,0,1
85 to_wm?HELLO,2,2,3,0,0,0,2
87 from_wm_0!HELLO,2,3,0,0,0,2
89 from_wm_1!HELLO,2,3,0,0,0,2
96 to_wm!HELLO,3,3,3,2,0,0,3
98 from_wm_local?HELLO,2,3,0,0,0,2
101 from_wm_local?HELLO,2,3,0,0,0,2
104 to_wm?HELLO,3,3,3,2,0,0,3
106 from_wm_0!HELLO,3,3,2,0,0,3
108 from_wm_1!HELLO,3,3,2,0,0,3
115 to_wm!TC,2,2,2,2,1,3,2
117 from_wm_local?HELLO,3,3,2,0,0,3
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5:ByzNode4:Node3:Node2:Node1:Wireless_Medium0:never_
118 + tc_selector@1: [0 8 0 0 ]

120 from_wm_local?HELLO,3,3,2,0,0,3
123 to_wm?TC,2,2,2,2,1,3,2
125 from_wm_0!TC,2,2,2,1,3,2
127 from_wm_1!TC,2,2,2,1,3,2
134 to_wm!HELLO,1,1,12,8,0,0,1
136 from_wm_local?TC,2,2,2,1,3,2
137 + tc_selector@1: [0 8 2 0 ]

139 from_wm_local?TC,2,2,2,1,3,2
140 + tc_selector@0: [0 0 2 0 ]

142 to_wm?HELLO,1,1,12,8,0,0,1
148 from_wm_2!HELLO,1,12,8,0,0,1
150 from_wm_3!HELLO,1,12,8,0,0,1
152 from_wm_local?HELLO,1,12,8,0,0,1
155 + tc_selector@3: [0 0 0 2 ]

158 to_wm!TC,3,3,3,2,1,3,3
160 from_wm_local?HELLO,1,12,8,0,0,1
163 to_wm?TC,3,3,3,2,1,3,3
165 from_wm_0!TC,3,3,2,1,3,3
167 from_wm_1!TC,3,3,2,1,3,3
174 to_wm!HELLO,2,2,3,2,0,0,2
176 from_wm_local?TC,3,3,2,1,3,3
177 + tc_selector@1: [0 8 2 2 ]

179 from_wm_local?TC,3,3,2,1,3,3
180 + tc_selector@0: [0 0 2 2 ]

182 to_wm?HELLO,2,2,3,2,0,0,2
184 from_wm_0!HELLO,2,3,2,0,0,2
186 from_wm_1!HELLO,2,3,2,0,0,2
192 from_wm_local?HELLO,2,3,2,0,0,2
193 + tc_selector@1: [0 12 2 2 ]

196 to_wm!TC,1,1,1,12,2,3,1
198 from_wm_local?HELLO,2,3,2,0,0,2
201 to_wm?TC,1,1,1,12,2,3,1
207 from_wm_2!TC,1,1,12,2,3,1
209 from_wm_3!TC,1,1,12,2,3,1
211 from_wm_local?TC,1,1,12,2,3,1
214 + tc_selector@3: [0 12 0 2 ]

217 to_wm!TC,3,3,1,7,2,2,1
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219 from_wm_local?TC,1,1,12,2,3,1
220 + tc_selector@2: [0 12 2 0 ]

222 to_wm?TC,3,3,1,7,2,2,1
224 from_wm_0!TC,3,1,7,2,2,1
226 from_wm_1!TC,3,1,7,2,2,1
233 to_wm!TC,3,3,3,2,1,3,3
235 from_wm_local?TC,3,1,7,2,2,1
238 from_wm_local?TC,3,1,7,2,2,1
239 + tc_selector@0: [0 7 2 2 ]

240 #676
241 to_wm?TC,3,3,3,2,1,3,3
243 from_wm_0!TC,3,3,2,1,3,3
245 from_wm_1!TC,3,3,2,1,3,3
250 #685
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0 0::init:
19 1:Wireless_Medium
20 2:Node
21 3:Node
24 to_wm!HELLO,0,0,0,0,0,0,0
26 4:Node
29 to_wm?HELLO,0,0,0,0,0,0,0
35 from_wm_2!HELLO,0,0,0,0,0,0
37 from_wm_3!HELLO,0,0,0,0,0,0
38 from_wm_local?HELLO,0,0,0,0,0,0
71 5:ByzNode
74 to_wm!HELLO,2,2,1,0,0,0,2
75 to_wm?HELLO,2,2,1,0,0,0,2
77 from_wm_0!HELLO,2,1,0,0,0,2
79 from_wm_1!HELLO,2,1,0,0,0,2
84 from_wm_local?HELLO,0,0,0,0,0,0
115 from_wm_local?HELLO,2,1,0,0,0,2
119 to_wm!HELLO,3,3,1,0,0,0,3
152 to_wm?HELLO,3,3,1,0,0,0,3
158 to_wm!HELLO,1,1,4,4,0,0,1
160 from_wm_local?HELLO,2,1,0,0,0,2
194 from_wm_0!HELLO,3,1,0,0,0,3
196 from_wm_1!HELLO,3,1,0,0,0,3
201 to_wm?HELLO,1,1,4,4,0,0,1
207 from_wm_2!HELLO,1,4,4,0,0,1
209 from_wm_3!HELLO,1,4,4,0,0,1
210 from_wm_local?HELLO,3,1,0,0,0,3
212 from_wm_local?HELLO,1,4,4,0,0,1
214 from_wm_local?HELLO,3,1,0,0,0,3
216 from_wm_local?HELLO,1,4,4,0,0,1
257 + tc_selector@2: [0 0 2 0 ]

359 to_wm!HELLO,1,1,12,4,0,0,1
361 to_wm?HELLO,1,1,12,4,0,0,1
367 from_wm_2!HELLO,1,12,4,0,0,1
369 from_wm_3!HELLO,1,12,4,0,0,1
370 from_wm_local?HELLO,1,12,4,0,0,1
405 to_wm!HELLO,2,2,3,2,0,0,2
406 from_wm_local?HELLO,1,12,4,0,0,1
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1104 from_wm_0!TC,2,1,12,2,2,1
1106 from_wm_1!TC,2,1,12,2,2,1
1111 to_wm?TC,2,2,2,3,2,3,2
1114 from_wm_local?TC,0,0,4,1,3,0
1123 + tc_selector@2: [4 12 3 0 ]

1131 from_wm_local?TC,2,1,12,2,2,1
1140 + tc_selector@0: [4 12 2 0 ]

1159 to_wm!TC,2,2,0,4,1,2,0
1161 from_wm_0!TC,2,2,3,2,3,2
1163 from_wm_local?TC,0,0,4,1,3,0
1172 + tc_selector@3: [4 12 2 0 ]

1179 from_wm_local?TC,2,2,3,2,3,2
1181 from_wm_local?TC,2,1,12,2,2,1
1192 from_wm_1!TC,2,2,3,2,3,2
1204 + tc_selector@0: [4 12 3 0 ]

1212 from_wm_local?TC,2,2,3,2,3,2
1221 + tc_selector@1: [0 12 3 0 ]

1229 to_wm?TC,2,2,0,4,1,2,0
1231 from_wm_0!TC,2,0,4,1,2,0
1233 from_wm_1!TC,2,0,4,1,2,0
1238 from_wm_local?TC,2,0,4,1,2,0
1240 from_wm_local?TC,2,0,4,1,2,0
1253 to_wm!TC,3,3,3,0,0,3,3
1261 + tc_selector@1: [4 12 3 0 ]

1270 to_wm?TC,3,3,3,0,0,3,3
1272 from_wm_0!TC,3,3,0,0,3,3
1274 from_wm_1!TC,3,3,0,0,3,3
1281 to_wm!TC,2,2,2,3,2,3,2
1282 from_wm_local?TC,3,3,0,0,3,3
1284 to_wm?TC,2,2,2,3,2,3,2
1286 from_wm_0!TC,2,2,3,2,3,2
1297 from_wm_local?TC,2,2,3,2,3,2
1312 to_wm!TC,0,0,2,3,2,1,2
1313 from_wm_local?TC,3,3,0,0,3,3
1325 from_wm_1!TC,2,2,3,2,3,2
1330 to_wm?TC,0,0,2,3,2,1,2
1336 from_wm_2!TC,0,2,3,2,1,2
1338 from_wm_3!TC,0,2,3,2,1,2
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1341 to_wm!TC,0,0,1,12,2,1,1
1342 from_wm_local?TC,0,2,3,2,1,2
1344 from_wm_local?TC,2,2,3,2,3,2
1347 from_wm_local?TC,0,2,3,2,1,2
1356 + tc_selector@3: [4 12 3 0 ]

1373 to_wm?TC,0,0,1,12,2,1,1
1379 from_wm_2!TC,0,1,12,2,1,1
1381 from_wm_3!TC,0,1,12,2,1,1
1384 to_wm!TC,1,1,1,12,2,3,1
1386 from_wm_local?TC,0,1,12,2,1,1
1406 from_wm_local?TC,0,1,12,2,1,1
1418 to_wm?TC,1,1,1,12,2,3,1
1424 from_wm_2!TC,1,1,12,2,3,1
1426 from_wm_3!TC,1,1,12,2,3,1
1429 to_wm!TC,3,3,3,0,0,3,3
1430 to_wm?TC,3,3,3,0,0,3,3
1432 from_wm_0!TC,3,3,0,0,3,3
1434 from_wm_1!TC,3,3,0,0,3,3
1442 to_wm!TC,1,1,0,4,1,1,0
1443 from_wm_local?TC,1,1,12,2,3,1
1454 to_wm?TC,1,1,0,4,1,1,0
1461 from_wm_local?TC,1,1,12,2,3,1
1463 from_wm_local?TC,3,3,0,0,3,3
1476 to_wm!TC,0,0,0,4,1,3,0
1487 from_wm_local?TC,3,3,0,0,3,3
1499 from_wm_2!TC,1,0,4,1,1,0
1501 from_wm_3!TC,1,0,4,1,1,0
1502 from_wm_local?TC,1,0,4,1,1,0
1513 from_wm_local?TC,1,0,4,1,1,0
1525 to_wm?TC,0,0,0,4,1,3,0
1531 from_wm_2!TC,0,0,4,1,3,0
1533 from_wm_3!TC,0,0,4,1,3,0
1534 from_wm_local?TC,0,0,4,1,3,0
1545 from_wm_local?TC,0,0,4,1,3,0
1559 to_wm!TC,1,1,2,3,2,1,2
1561 to_wm?TC,1,1,2,3,2,1,2
1567 from_wm_2!TC,1,2,3,2,1,2
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1569 from_wm_3!TC,1,2,3,2,1,2
1570 from_wm_local?TC,1,2,3,2,1,2
1583 to_wm!TC,2,2,1,12,2,0,1
1585 to_wm?TC,2,2,1,12,2,0,1
1587 from_wm_0!TC,2,1,12,2,0,1
1589 from_wm_1!TC,2,1,12,2,0,1
1594 from_wm_local?TC,1,2,3,2,1,2
1596 from_wm_local?TC,2,1,12,2,0,1
1609 to_wm!TC,2,2,0,4,1,0,0
1611 to_wm?TC,2,2,0,4,1,0,0
1613 from_wm_0!TC,2,0,4,1,0,0
1615 from_wm_local?TC,2,1,12,2,0,1
1636 from_wm_1!TC,2,0,4,1,0,0
1641 from_wm_local?TC,2,0,4,1,0,0
1643 from_wm_local?TC,2,0,4,1,0,0
1656 to_wm!TC,0,0,1,12,2,0,1
1668 to_wm?TC,0,0,1,12,2,0,1
1674 from_wm_2!TC,0,1,12,2,0,1
1676 from_wm_3!TC,0,1,12,2,0,1
1677 from_wm_local?TC,0,1,12,2,0,1
1690 to_wm!TC,1,1,0,4,1,0,0
1691 to_wm?TC,1,1,0,4,1,0,0
1697 from_wm_local?TC,0,1,12,2,0,1
1699 from_wm_2!TC,1,0,4,1,0,0
1701 from_wm_3!TC,1,0,4,1,0,0
1702 from_wm_local?TC,1,0,4,1,0,0
1723 from_wm_local?TC,1,0,4,1,0,0
1733 timeout
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Appendix B: Other Secure Routing Protocols
Three secure protocols are described in this appendix. The protocols are Secure
AODV (SAODV), Secure Efficient Distance Vector (SEAD), and Secure Link State
Routing Protocol (SLSP). These protocols were not modeled with the secure verification
framework. A logical progression would be to model SLSP next because it shares several
common features with OLSR and Secure OLSR. SEAD is similar to Secure OLSR
because it is proactive and SAODV is related because it is table-based. The
security-mechanisms employed in each protocol are significantly different.
B.1 Secure AODV (SAODV)
Secure AODV (SAODV) [23] is based closely on AODV. The protocol’s objective is
to meet import authorization, source authentication, integrity, and data authentication for
data used in the routing process. SAODV has several admitted weaknesses. The protocol
cannot account for Byzantine nodes, cannot provide non-repudiation, and cannot prevent a
malicious node from tunneling or the invisible node attack (INA) (i.e., colluding
attackers).
For the proper operation of SAODV, it is assumed that a key management system
exists, for example PKI. In addition, a node’s identity is verifiable through that node’s
public key. Finally, to simplify the analysis, it is assumed that intermediate nodes cannot
provide previously known paths to RReqs. (SAODV’s Double Signature Extension can
allow intermediate nodes to securely cache routes to RReqs.)
At a high-level SAODV meets its objectives by digitally signing all immutable fields.
All fields in each RREQ and RREP are considered immutable aside from the hop count.
For the one mutable field in AODV, hop count, one-way hash chaining can be used to
assure that the field never decreases as it is travels toward the destination in a route request.
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Specifically when SAODV generates a RReq or a RRep the fields Hash Function,
Max Hop Count, Top Hash, and Hash are initialized. Max Hop Count is initially set to the
time-to-live, a specific Hash Function is set, the Hash is set to a random integer, and the
Top Hash is evaluated by performing the Hash Function Max Hop Count times on the
initial Hash value.
When a node receives a RReq or RRep the hash of the hop count is computed and
forwarded with all other information. SAODV requires that every node first verify the
signature of the RReq or RRep messages before being processed. If the verification is
successful then AODV processed the messages as normal plus the signing and hashing
functions as described in [23].
The modifications to AODV proposed in SAODV do not significantly change the
underlying operation of the protocol. The only new fields defined by SAODV are Hash
Function, Max Hop Count, Top Hash, and Hash. The adding of these fields would add a
constant overhead in state-vector size to the Promela models; therefore, it remains feasible
to model SAODV in Promela and perform SPIN verifications on such a model.
As a final note, the discussion of SAODV omits RErr messages. The Promela model
makes this same omission. It is reasonable in the models to assume that mobility is not a
consideration. Link breakages are the only reason for triggering a RErr message, thus all
models only consider a static topology for the network. Similar logic is used in Ács [19]
to provide a proof for the endairA protocol. 7
B.2 Secure Efficient Distance Vector (SEAD)
Secure Efficient Distance Vector (SEAD) [21] is based on DSDV, a proactive
protocol which uses a destination-sequence number to prevent routing loops. SEAD is not
considered to be secure against more than two malicious attackers that collude. The
7 The assumption does not imply there are no issues with mobility. Quite the opposite, if it can be shown
that the protocol is insecure without mobility then the protocol remains insecure even after adding mobility
to the model.
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primary goal of SEAD is to protect the destination-sequence number and minimum route
length thus protecting the loop freedom property of the protocol.
Let m represent the shortest possible route length and s represent the current
sequence number. SEAD using hash trees assures that an attacker can advertise at best a
shortest path of m + 1. To achieve this goal SEAD utilizes one-way hash chains and
Merkle hash trees. One-way hash chains guarantee that the lower bound of path length, m,
cannot be lessened by Byzantine node. This guarantee, however, allows an adversary to
advertise another route with distance m, Merkle hash trees can be used to further ensure an
adversary cannot advertise a path less than m + 1.
The one way hash-chain is calculated by the recurrence relation hi = H(hi−1) where
h0 = x and x is a random integer and i is the current node. The hash function ensures that
nodes down stream of i cannot modify the chain without completely corrupting it. A
corrupt hash chain can easily be identified and the associated packets discarded.
Merkle hash trees are calculated recursively from a parent root, mp, according to
mp = H[ml||mr]. The expression, mp = H[ml||mr], reads the parent value mp is equal to the
one-way hash of the concatenation of ml and mr. Given this construct it is possible for
every pair of nodes to calculate a hash based solely on information provided by the
previous node. This property ensures that an adversary cannot simply rebroadcast the last
hash value in the chain and pass it off as being valid because the recipient can verify that
the adversarial node is not who he claims to be.
DSDV is not examined from a modeling perspective; however, SEAD does not add
much additional burden to the protocol. For implementing Merkle trees additional hashing
information must be passed which is, in the worst case, linear to the networks diameter.
Thus if modeling DSDV is feasible using formal methods then so to is modeling SEAD.
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Table B.1: link-state update (LSU) fields.
Field Purpose
RLS U Track current hops this update has traversed
Zone Radius XR component of Hash chain
Sequence Uniquely identify the LSU paired with origin address
Signature Public key of the LSU’s origin
Hops Traversed X1 component of Hash chain
B.3 Secure Link State Routing Protocol (SLSP)
Papadimitratos [24] proposes the Secure Link State Routing Protocol (SLSP). The
protocol can be adapted to meet the security challenges of hybrid routing protocols
incorporating both reactive and proactive sub-protocols.
SLSP’s security considerations are limited to individual Byzantine attackers. The
protocol designers do not claim that the protocol can be considered secure when
challenged by two or more malicious nodes that collude. The protocol is considered to
prevent advertisement of non-existent or fabricated link-states, prevent spoofing of peers,
thwart Denial of Service (DoS) flooding attacks, and strengthen the over all neighbor
discovery process.
The basic components of SLSP are link-state updates (LSUs) (equivalent to TC
messages), neighbor look-up protocol (NLP) notifications, the hash chaining function H(),
and key certification. Key certification is assumed to be provided by threshold
cryptography, local repositories, or a distributed certificate authority (CA). H() is defined
as Xi = Hi(X), i = 1, ...,R, where R is the network diameter and H0(X) = X. An LSU
consists of the fields in Table B.1. SLSP modifies each LSU field as the LSU propagates
through the network.
In SLSP nodes are bound to a single, unique identifying address and public key.
Neighboring nodes can be unambiguously identified based on their public key, i.e.,
mapped to their unique address.
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SLSP operates in the following fashion. SLSP performs neighbor discovery by
exchanging signed HELLO messages between on-hop nodes. Only validated HELLO
messages are accepted. The NLP then runs and specifically maintains a mapping of
one-hop neighbors, identifies discrepancies, and measures the control packet rates. NLP
will generate a notification if a neighbor uses an address different from the one recorded in
the neighbor set or two neighbors use the address. Any packets from a source that
triggered a notification are discarded. Nodes receiving an LSU validate the update,
suppress duplicate updates, and relay previously un-relayed LSUs. A validated LSU
update is only committed if the both nodes advertise the same state of the link (i.e., the
link is bi-directional).
SLSP provides a packet format for public key distribution. However, LSUs are also
able to perform key distribution; therefore, discussion of the public key distribution packet
is unnecessary.
Notably SLSP differs from OLSR in several respects. SLSP provides no concept of
MPRs and in fact uses this as a security feature. By implementing pure flooding SLSP
ensures that a non-adversarial route, if once exists, will be found. In the same vein SLSP
has no requirement to discovery two-hop neighbors, thus making SLSP considerably
simpler to model than OLSR.
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Appendix C: Acronyms
ANSN advertised neighbor sequence number . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
AODV Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
ARAN Authenticated Routing for Ad Hoc Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
AVANTSSAR Automated Validation of Trust and Security of Service-oriented
Architectures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30
AVISPA Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications . . . . . . . 27
CA certificate authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
CIA confidentiality, integrity, and availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
CL-AtSe Constraint Logic-Attack Searcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
CPAL-ES Cryptographic Protocol Analysis Language - Evaluation System . . . . . . . . . . 27
CSMA/CA Carrier Sense Multiple Access/Collision Avoidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
DSDV Destination Sequence Distance Vector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
DSR Dynamic source routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
DYMO Dynamic MANET On-demand Routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
DoS Denial of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
GloMoSim Global Mobile Simulator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
INA invisible node attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
LSU link-state update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
LTL Linear temporal logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
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LUNAR Lightweight Underlay Network for Ad hoc Routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
MANET mobile ad hoc network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
MPR multi-point relay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
NLP neighbor look-up protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
NS2 Network Simulator 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
OFMC On-the-Fly Model Cheker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
OLSR Optimized Link-State Routing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
OSI model Open Systems Interconnection model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
PKI Public Key Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Promela Process Metalanguage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
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